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RECENT CASES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-IN REM JURISDICTION OVER
NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT CANNOT BE OBTAINED
BY ATTACHING RESIDENT INSURER'S OBLIGATION
TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY DEFENDANT-Javorek v.
Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768
(1976).
On December 28, 1973, California resident Jack Larson
was injured and his wife killed in an automobile accident in
Oregon.' An action was brought in California for personal injuries and wrongful death against Frank Javorek and Marion
Brice, both Oregon residents, alleging negligence.'
Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
415.40 Larson attempted to serve summons and complaint by
mail on the defendants in Oregon, but was unsuccessful in his
attempt to acquire in personam jurisdiction.
Larson then applied, pursuant to California Code of Civil
Procedure section 537.3 (c), to the Superior Court of Monterey
County for a writ of attachment on the property of the
defendants in California. 4 The property sought was the "'contract obligations of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company . . . to defend and indemnify each and/or both of
these defendants against a debt owing to each and/or all of the
plaintiffs.' "I The writ and a notice of attachment were served
on State Farm, an Illinois corporation, at its California regional
office in Santa Rosa.
In September, 1974, the defendants appeared specially6 on
a motion to quash the writ of attachment alleging, inter alia,
1. Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768
(1976).
2. Id. at 631, 552 P.2d at 731, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
3. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 415.40 (West 1973).
4. 17 Cal. 3d at 632, 552 P.2d at 731, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 771. See CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 537.3(c) (West Supp. 1976).
5. 17 Cal. 3d at 632, 552 P.2d at 731, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 771 (quoting from plaintiff's application for the writ).
6. A defendant appearing in California on a motion to quash service of summons
for lack of jurisdiction or on a motion to stay or dismiss because of inconvenient forum
is presumed to be making a special appearance and not submitting to personal jurisdiction. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 418.10(d) (West 1973); see Hartford v. Superior Court,
47 Cal. 2d 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956).
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the lack of personal jurisdiction7 and that California was an
inconvenient forum.' That motion was denied by the Superior
Court of Monterey County and on petition for writ of mandate9
was denied by the court of appeals. 0
On a writ of mandate, the question before the California
Supreme Court was whether quasi in rem jurisdiction over the
defendants could be grounded on the attachment of the insurer's obligations. The court, faced with the problem of reviewing the continuing validity of the rule in Seider v. Roth,"
as applied in California by Turner v. Evers,"2 was not persuaded that the rationale in Seider was internally cohesive, nor
was it convinced that the insured's rights to be defended and
indemnified by the insurer, held attachable in Seider and
Turner, were property subject to attachment under California
law. Thus, it refused to follow Seider, overruled Turner and
quashed the attachment.
In reaching this result, the Javorek court examined Seider
v. Roth in detail. The facts in Seider were similar to those in
Javorek. Seider, a New York resident, was injured in a Vermont automobile accident through the negligence of a motorist
from Quebec. The New York court issued an order to attach the
contractual obligation of Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company to defend and indemnify the defendant at Hartford's
New York office. 3
The question before the New York Court of Appeals in
Seider was "whether Hartford's contractual obligation to defendant is a debt or cause of action such as may be attached."' 4
Answering this question in the affirmative, the court analyzed
the nature of the insurer's obligations. Under New York Civil
Practice Laws sections 5201 and 6202, debts are attachable. 5
Chief Judge Desmond, writing for the majority, stated that as
soon as the insurer is notified of the accident "several
obligations . . . accrue . . . whether or not a suit is ever
7. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 418.10(a)(1) (West 1973), allows a defendant to quash
service when there is no personal jurisdiction.
8. Id. §§ 418.10(a)(2), 410.30, support a motion to quash on grounds of inconvenient forum.
9. Id. § 418.10(c).
10. Javorek v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1975).
11. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
12. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1973).
13. 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100-01.
14. Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
15. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5201 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76); id. § 6202 (McKinney 1963).
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brought."'" Logically, he proceeded to the conclusion that an
7
accrued obligation is a debt and is therefore attachable.
In concluding that an insurer's obligations are attachable
5
debts, the Seider court relied upon In re Riggle's Estate.' Superficially, Riggle is factually similar to Seider and Javorek: a
New York plaintiff (Wells) was injured in an automobile accident in Wyoming caused by the negligence of Riggle, an Illinois
resident. 9 However, there the similarity ends. Wells brought
her action in the New York court after Riggle was personally
served in that state.20 Wells had thus obtained in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant, which the Seider and Javorek
plaintiffs were unable to do. The trial had already commenced
and the insurer was defending Riggle in New York when Riggle
died. Riggle's executrix moved for a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion was denied and a representative2' was appointed by the court. Under New York law such a
representative could only be appointed if the decedent left per22
sonal property within the state. The Riggle court, finding no
New York precedent, held that the insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify was personal property in the state within
the broad meaning of the Surrogate's Court Act and for the
23
purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon a Surrogate's Court.
In holding that an insurer's obligation is an attachable
24
debt, the Seider court took notice of the holding in Riggle that
the insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify made the insured a creditor and the insurer a debtor. Justice Burke's dissent in Seider,25 however, pointed out that the facts in Riggle
were sufficiently different to distinguish it from Seider, and
that the Riggle holding was apparently intended only to apply
to a situation where the insurer's obligations had already ac16. 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
17. Id. at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
18. 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
19. Id. at 76-77, 181 N.E.2d at 437, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
20. Id. at 75, 181 N.E.2d at 437, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
21. Id. at 76, 181 N.E.2d at 437, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
New York law provides for court appointment of an ancillary administrator in the
CT.PROC.
event of the death of a non-resident holding property in the state. N.Y. SURR.
Acr § 206 (McKinney 1967).
22. N.Y. SURR. CT.PROC. AcT § 208 (McKinney 1967).
23. 11 N.Y.2d 73, 76, 181 N.E.2d 436, 437-38, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417.
24. Although the Riggle court was unanimous on the issue of the status of insured
at 439, 226
and insurer, one justice dissented on other grounds. Id. at 79, 181 N.E.2d
N.Y.S.2d at 420.
25. 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
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crued by virtue of the fact that jurisdiction had been obtained
by independent means, and could thus be said to be a debt
owed to the insured. In fact, Riggle's insurer was in the process
of "paying" his debt: he was in court defending Riggle when
Riggle died.2"
Justice Burke, in dissent, pointed out the circularity of the
majority's reasoning:
The jurisdiction . . . is based upon a promise which evi-

dently does not mature until there is jurisdiction. The existence of the policy is used as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to start the very action necessary to activate the
insurer's obligation under the policy. In other words, the
promise to defend the insured is assumed to furnish the
jurisdiction for a civil suit which must be validly commenced before the obligation to defend can possibly accrue. This is a bootstrap situation.2
Seider has been adopted by only one other state supreme
court28 and has generated a great deal of commentary. 9 Among
26. Id. at 116, 216 N.E.2d at 315-16, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
27. Id. at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
28. Actually, no court has fully adopted the Seider procedure. In an apparent
retaliatory move, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated, "We are merely
holding that ...
in a suit by a resident of New Hampshire against a resident of New
York where the Seider rule prevails the trial court properly denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiff's action." Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, -,
313 A.2d
129, 133 (1973). Thus, New Hampshire residents may assert Seider attachments only
against residents of states which permit their residents to assert Seider attachments.
Conceivably, other states which reject the Seider rule per se might decide to allow
Seider attachments against New York residents, simply because it would seem to be
unfair if New Yorkers could assert Seider attachments against citizens who did not
have the same weapon at their disposal. The result would be that the forum would be
chosen by a race to the courthouse: the "winner" would file a Seider action secure in
the knowledge that the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction will be
denied.
Circuit Judge Anderson foresaw even greater inequity and stated in his dissent in
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969): "it is quite likely that all fifty states will be compelled to enact like measures.
As a result each party will commence suit as quickly as possible in an endeavor to have
the litigation in the state where he resides." Under this theory each state would allow
its residents to assert Seider attachments against residents of all the other states. In
view of the general disfavor shown by the states toward Seider, however, it seems
unlikely that the doctrine will become uniformly entrenched in state law. Whether a
New Yorker could assert a Seider attachment against a Californian has yet to be seen;
certainly the Californian would be well-advised to raise the issue of denial of due
process in his motion to dismiss.

29. See, e.g., Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New Chapter in LongArm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 769 (1967); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation,67 COLUM. L. REV. 550
(1967); Comment, Attachment of Liability InsurancePolicies, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1108
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the most frequent criticisms is the contention that the Seider
doctrine enforces de facto in personam jurisdiction3 upon the
insured defendant.3 Where the insurer's obligations can be attached, the insured is placed in a dilemma. If he does not
appear, the insurer may not be obligated to indemnify him, for
typical insurance policies require the insured to be present in
the defense.32 Yet if he does appear to defend on the merits, he
is making a general appearance and thereby conferring in personam jurisdiction on the court.13 The

New York Court of

Appeals "solved" this dilemma in Simpson v. Loehmann,34
which came down a year after Seider and presented the same
fact situation. In Simpson the court declared flatly that "there
may not be any recovery against the defendant in this sort of
case in an amount greater than the face value of such insurance
policy even though he proceeds with the defense on the merits." This result upset the traditional and fundamental notion
that a trial on the merits should be a complete and final adjudication of the case. Thus, the Second Circuit found it necessary,
in Minichiello v. Rosenberg,36 to come to the aid of the plaintiff
whose claim exceeds the policy limits of the defendant's insurance coverage. Realizing that such a plaintiff might find it
necessary to relitigate the case in other states until he could
satisfy his claim, the court declared, first, that the Simpson
holding was defensible 31 on grounds of fairness to defendants
who had already suffered de facto in personam jurisdiction,
and second, that a trial on the merits with jurisdiction based
on Seider/Simpson attachment would be limited to the policy
limits, but would not collaterally bar plaintiffs from bringing
(1968); Comment, Quasi in Rem JurisdictionBased on Insurer'sObligations, 19 STAN.
L. REV. 654 (1967); Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 58 (1968).
30. Although defendants in California are protected from an assertion of personal
jurisdiction when appearing on a motion to quash, see note 6 supra, an appearance on
the merits constitutes a general appearance, and confers personal jurisdiction upon
the court.
31. Comment, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19
Stan. L. Rev. 654, at 654 (1967).
32. Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 636, 552 P.2d 728, 734, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 768, 774 (1976).
33. Id. at 636, 552 P.2d at 734, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
34. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), aff'd on rehearing,
21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S. 2d 914 (1967).
35. 21 N.Y.2d 990, 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 320, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916.
36. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
37. Id. at 111 n.7.
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actions elsewhere in order to satisfy their claims.3" Minichiello
ignored the function of collateral estoppel which is to protect
parties from having to litigate the same issues more than once,
and to reduce the burden on the courts by avoiding a multiplicity of suits.3" The Minichiello court added that the holding
applied only to Seider/Simpson type of actions, "[w]hatever
the right rule may be as to quasi in rem judgments generally." 40
Turner v. Evers4' brought the Seider doctrine to California
in 1973. In Turner, the appellate department of the Sacramento Superior Court held that Seider-type attachment could
be used under California law.42 The case was never appealed,
so for three and a half years the Seider doctrine went unchallenged in California."3
The Supreme Court of California in Javorek based its
analysis of the applicability of Seider in California on three
main points. First, the court discussed the requirement of property to secure an attachment under Code of Civil Procedure
section 537. Second, the court considered whether the insured's
contractual obligation to indemnify is a property right for purposes of that law. Third, the court similarly considered the
38. Id. at 112.
39. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942).
40. 410 F.2d at 112.
41. 31 Cal. App.3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1973).
42. Id. at 20, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97.
43. On facts similar to Seider the Turner court adopted the Seider holding that
jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant was validly obtained by attaching his
insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify. The Seider court had supported its
holding with Riggle; the Turner court found support for its holding in a remarkably
similar California unpublished opinion: Keck v. Superior Court, No. 3 Civil 13521,
(Cal. Ct. App., 3d Dist., filed Nov. 14, 1972). The Turner court reasoned that since
New York and California statutory and case law were so similar, its holding should
parallel New York's. 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 21, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
The Turner court attempted to deal with the circularity of Seider's rationale. The
court declared that "the obligation to indemnify requires only the possibility of a valid
judgment against the insured personally or depriving him of his property" to become
an attachable debt. Id. at 18, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (emphasis added). However, an
element of circularity creeps into the "possibility" argument also. In order to have a
possibility of a valid judgment against the insured, there still must be a validly commenced action. And in order for there to be a validly commenced action, there must
be jurisdiction, which is based on the attachment of the very obligation which does
not become due and payable until the action is commenced. The Turner court's introduction of the element of possibility into the defective jurisdictional formula created
by the Seider court does not eliminate the defect.
Because of the circularity of the Turnercourt's reasoning, the Javorek court stated
that "we therefore disagree with, and disapprove to the extent that it is inconsistent
with this opinion, Turner v. Evers .
17 Cal. 3d at 641, 552 P.2d at 738, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 778.
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certainty of the obligation to defend as a property right. The
court held that both obligations were too contingent, and that
they could arise only after jurisdiction had been acquired by
other, independent means.
As pointed out by the court, the California law governing
attachments involving out-of-state defendants could hardly be
broader." It states simply that all property of the defendant
may be attached.' The problem, then, as stated by the court,
was whether the attached obligations constituted property
under the Civil Procedure Code."
The holding in Seider that obligations are debts and are
therefore attachable was based on the assumption that the
obligations accrue when the accident occurs. The Javorek
court, however, reasoned that the obligation to indemnify does
not accrue until the insured is found liable. Relying on
Brunskill v. Stutman, 7 the court delineated the boundary between attachable and non-attachable obligations by distinguishing between situations "where only the amount of
liability is uncertain and those where the fact of liability is
uncertain.""
In the court's view, the obligation to indemnify which was
attached is a contingency which becomes property only upon
a finding that the insured is in fact liable. 9 To give property
status to this contingency before a finding of liability is to
engage in a "circular ratiocination," not acceptable to the
Javorek court.50
However, the Javorek court felt that the question of the
property status of the insurer's obligation to defend was subject
to other considerations since it is not contingent upon a show44. 17 Cal. 3d 629, 639, 552 P.2d 728, 736, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768, 776 (1976).
45. California's new attachment law, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 487.010 et seq.
(West Supp. 1976) (effective January 1, 1977), is somewhat less broad. See text accompanying note 52 infra. Plaintiffs in Javoreh asked the court to apply the new law,
apparently in the belief that it would allow attachment of the insurer's obligation to
defend as a chose in action. However, the writ of attachment issued by the plaintiffs
was under CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 537.3 (West Supp. 1976) and the request was denied.
46. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 537.3(c) (West Supp. 1976).
47. 186 Cal. App. 2d 97, 8 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1960).
48. 17 Cal. 3d at 640, 552 P.2d at 737, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
49. Id. at 642, 552 P.2d at 738, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
50. Id. at 642-43, 552 P.2d at 738-39, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79. In an action with
jurisdiction based upon attachment of the obligation to indemnify, if the judgment is
in favor of the insured, the insurer's obligation to indemnify never matures and it can
then be said that the action had no jurisdictional basis. See id. at 641, 552 P.2d at 73738, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 777-78.
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ing of liability of the insured. The obligation to defend can be
said to exist as soon as the accident occurs. If the insured can
claim his contractual right to a defense, it would seem that the
plaintiff could attach it. The Javorek court found that even a
presently existing, due and payable obligation to defend is not
attachable property because in a suit with jurisdiction based
on such an attachment the prevailing party would not be able
to satisfy its judgment from the attached property. Since a
quasi in rem judgment must be satisfied solely from the attached property and since, at the end of the trial, the obligation
to defend would no longer exist, there would be no attached
property from which to satisfy the judgment, and thus, nothing
on which to base quasi in rem jurisdiction. 5
The elimination of Seider attachment in California raises
questions as to the procedure to be followed by California
plaintiffs with claims against residents of other states. More
specifically, should a plaintiff be denied the use and protection
of the courts of his domicile merely because he was not fortunate enough to collide with a non-resident having attachable
property in the state?
California's new attachment law, effective January 1,
1977,52 deals somewhat more specifically with the nature of
attachable property than does the present statute.53 The old
law permitted attachment of the property of non-residents
"without limitation as to type.""5 The new statute deals with
non-resident attachments5 and provides that choses in action,
among other things, are attachable. A chose in action is said
to include an interest in or a claim under an insurance policy.56
The law further provides that all choses in action must not be
conditioned upon any event other than the passage of time.57
This clearly eliminates the obligation to indemnify, which is
conditioned upon the occurrence of a trial on the merits. But
if the obligation to defend is said to exist upon accrual of the
cause of action, does that make it attachable?58 Or is the fact
51. Id. at 645, 552 P.2d at 740, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
52. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 487.010 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
53. Id. § 537.3.
54. Id. § 537.3(c).
55. Id. § 492.010. See also, id. § 488.370 (choses in action).
56. Id. § 481.050.
57. Id. § 481.050(a).
58. While the Javorek court was not persuaded by the argument that the obligation to defend arises prior to the filing of the action, it felt it necessary to eliminate
attachment of that obligation for the additional reason that it is not the type of
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that the insured must indicate his wish to be defended "an
event other than the passage of time?" Faced with this question, it is likely that the court would stand by its Javorek
holding that the obligation to defend is not attachable property
because, first, it is conditioned upon the insured's deciding to
file suit and, second, because it is not the type of property from
which a judgment can be satisfied.59
Clearly, other property interests are more certain and are
thus more suitable for attachment. For example, property in
the state, such as bank accounts, debts owed to the defendant,
and real property is subject to attachment for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction over non-residents, without exemption .1
If such property is attached, quasi in rem jurisdiction is conferred. The only limitation on such an action is that the judgment will be limited to the value of the attached property. It
is frequently the case that defendants in quasi in rem actions
fail to appear, in which case a default judgment is entered.
Before Javorek, under a Seider procedure where the attached
property was the insurer's obligations, the insurer often preferred simply to default and pay the face value of the policy to
the plaintiff, thereby saving the expense of litigating. This was
particularly true where the claim exceeded the policy limits
and a settlement within the policy limits was unlikely. Under
Javorek such default actions against the insurer will be unavailable in California; only where valid in personam jurisdiction is obtained over the defendant by methods such as personal service or service by mail"' will the insurer become involved in the defense.
Raoul Renaud
property from which a judgment can be satisfied. See text accompanying note 51
supra.

59. 17 Cal. 3d at 646, 552 P.2d at 741, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
60. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 492.040 (West Supp. 1976). However, once the defendant has filed a general appearance in the action he is entitled to claim the exemptions
of section 487.020 and attached property which is exempt will be released to him.
61. Id. § 415.40 (West 1973).

EMPLOYMENT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS-STATES MAY
IMPOSE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES ON EMPLOYER OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IF SUCH EMPLOYMENT
WOULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON LAWFUL RESIDENT WORKERS-De Canas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976).
California Labor Code section 2805(a) provides: "No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to
lawful residence in the United States if such employment
would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers."'
The Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, considered
whether section 2805(a) was unconstitutional2 on either of two
grounds: first, it attempted to regulate immigration' and foreign affairs,4 a subject matter reserved to the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction5 or second, assuming that the
states had concurrent jurisdiction, it was pre-empted under
the supremacy clause' by the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), 7 thereby leaving no room for the individual states to
1. The remainder of section 2805 provides:
(b) A person found guilty of violation of subdivision (a) is punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than
five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense.
(c) The foregoing provisions shall not be a bar to civil action against
the employer based upon a violation of subdivision (a).
CAL. LABOR CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976). See note 74 and accompanying text infra.
2. De Canas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933, 935 (1976).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4: "The Congress shall have the Power . . . To
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization ....
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have the Power . . . To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ....
"
5. 96 S. Ct. at 936. See note 25 and accompanying text infra.
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
See Comment, The Impact of Pre-Emption on Federal State Cooperation, 1967
U. ILL. L.F. 656.
7. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is found at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et
seq. (1970). It was passed over President Truman's veto on June 27, 1952. [1952] U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 246.
Congress thought it was enacting a comprehensive federal statutory scheme for
regulation of immigration and naturalization. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
accompanying H.R. No. 5678 reprinted in [19521 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1653, 1677-78, states in pertinent part: "The purpose of the bill is to enact a comprehensive, revised immigration, naturalization, and nationality code . . . . H.R. 5678
represents the first attempt to bring within one cohesive and comprehensive statute
the various laws relating to immigration, naturalization, and nationality .
H.R.
5678 was the bill enacting the INA of 1952.
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legislate.'
Petitioners, Leonor De Canas and Miguel Canas, were
immigrant migrant farm workers who brought an action in
October, 1972, pursuant to section 2805(c) against respondents
Anthony Bica and Juan Silva, farm labor contractors in California superior court.' De Canas' complaint alleged that they
were discharged from employment and had not been rehired
due to a surplus of labor resulting from the contractors' knowing employment of aliens not lawfully admitted to residence in
the United States. 0 Petitioners sought reinstatement, actual
damages, exemplary damages" and a permanent injunction"
3
against responents' wilful employment of "illegal aliens."' In
February, 1973, the superior court held section 2805 to be unconstitutional and dismissed the complaint. 4 In July, 1974, the
8. The Court previously addressed itself to this issue in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941). In Hines, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act
saying that Congress, by adopting a comprehensive scheme for regulation of aliens,
precluded such state action.
When the national government by treaty or statute has established rules
and regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of
aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the supreme law of the land. No
state can add to or take from the force and effect of such treaty or statute
Id. at 62. De Canas is distinguishable from Hines. See note 39 infra and text accompanying note 59 infra.
9. De Canas v. Bica, No. SM 11789 (Super. Ct., Santa Barbara County, Cal.,
Feb. 14, 1973).
10. 96 S. Ct. at 935.
11. The claim for damages was premised on tortious interference with petitioners' right to pursue a livelihood. De Canas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 979, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 444, 445 (1974).
12. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3369 (West 1973) permits any member of the general public
to bring suit for injunctive relief and damages against any person who engages in any
unfair or unlawful business practice.
13. 96 S. Ct. at 935 n.2. The Court assumed arguendo in referring to "illegal
aliens," that the prohibition of § 2805(a) only applies to aliens who would not be
permitted to work in the United States under the pertinent federal laws and regulations.
14. The superior court, in an unreported memorandum opinion, sustained a
demurrer without leave to amend holding that:
Labor Code § 2805 is unconstitutional [because] (1) It encroaches upon,
and interferes with, a comprehensive regulatory scheme enacted by Congress in the exercise of its exclusive power over immigration, and (2)
violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution . . . . [Als a criminal statute it is too vague and uncertain
for enforcement. The statute forbids hiring of "an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States" and under the U.S. Immigration laws, there are many such aliens who may work in the United
States, under certain classifications, and Labor Code § 2805 is in direct
conflict with Federal Law.
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court of appeal affirmed 5 on the basis that section 2805(a) is
an unconstitutional attempt to regulate the conditions for
admission of foreign nationals" and in the area of immigration
and naturalization, congressional power is specifically delegated and exclusive.' 7 The court of appeal further indicated
that state regulatory power over this subject was foreclosed
when Conress, "as an incident of national sovereignty,"'" enacted the INA as a comprehensive scheme governing all aspects
of immigration and naturalization, including the employment
of aliens, and "specifically and intentionally declined to add
sanctions on employers to its control mechanism."'" The California Supreme Court denied review in October 1974, but the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 0 and later reversed the lower court, remanding the case.'
The Court decided that section 2805 is not an unconstitutional attempt to regulate immigration,22 and that neither the
nature of the subject matter nor any unmistakable act of Congress requires the conclusion of pre-emption.23 The Court
noted, however, that even absent congressional intent to
"occupy the field," the Supremacy Clause invalidates
any
state statute that burdens or conflicts with federal laws,24 and
De Canas v. Bica, No. SM 11789 (Super. Ct., Santa Barbara County, Cal., Feb. 14,
1973). Injunctive relief pursuant to CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1973) would constitute
a similar exercise of power and, therefore, would fail for the same reasons. See note 69
and accompanying text infra.
15. 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 981, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (1974).
16. 96 S. Ct. at 935 n.3. The Court questions the lower court's determination of
section 2805's objective. Another division of the court of appeal said that "the section
is not aimed at immigration control or regulation but seeks to aid California residents
in obtaining jobs ....
" Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 40 Cal. App. 3d 673, 686,
115 Cal. Rptr. 435, 442 (1974). However, the Dolores court also invalidated section
2805, stating that the statute "does or could affect immigration in several ways." Id.
at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43. See text accompanying notes 66-76 infra.
17. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 980, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
18. Id. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892), the Court,
sustaining the action of the executive department in putting in force an act of Congress
excluding aliens, said:
It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to selfpreservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or
to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see
fit to prescribe.
19. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 979, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 446. See note 48 infra.
20. De Canas v. Bica, 422 U.S. 1040 (1975).
21. 96 S. Ct. at 941.
22. Id. at 936.
23. Id. at 937.
24. Id. at 937 n.5.
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thus remanded the case for a determination of the existence of
such a conflict.
Since the power to regulate immigration is exclusively fed25
eral, the first question the Court considered was whether section 2805 attempted to regulate immigration and naturalization. The Court noted that it has never held that every state
enactment which deals with aliens is equivalent to regulating
immigration." The Court evaluated the statute in De Canas
this way:
In this case, California has sought to strengthen its economy by adopting federal standards in imposing criminal
sanctions against state employers who knowingly employ
25. Id. at 936.
See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (invalidating
a California statute barring fishing licenses on basis of INA classifications); Fong Yu
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (affirming congressional power to exclude
or expel aliens or any class of aliens, even in contravention to earlier treaty); Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (congressional power to exclude aliens is
inherent in national sovereignty); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese
Exclusion Case) 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding the validity of a congressional act
which conflicted with and abrogated a prior treaty); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S.
275 (1876) (declaring unconstitutional a California statute requiring a $500 two year
bond for certain classes of passengers, among which are "lewd and debauched women";
the bond was commutable by payment to the commissioner in charge of any sum he
may demand, with twenty percent to be retained by the commissioner); Henderson v.
Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876) (invalidating a state law requiring a $300 four
year bond for each incoming passenger and in the alternative a $1.50 fee per person);
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849) (state tax on the master or owner of a
vessel for every passenger arriving in state port is an unconstitutional attempt to
regulate foreign commerce, immigration and naturalization).
That the power to control such issues is an incident of federal power was emphasized by the Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case:
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty to
the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers
delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when,
in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require
it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of anyone. The powers
of government are delegated in trust to the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other parties. They cannot be abandoned or surrendered. Nor can their exercise be hampered, when needed for the public
good, by any considerations of private interest.
130 U.S. at 609.
The De Canas Court emphasized the limited nature of the power of the states in
this area: "'Under the Constitution the states are granted no such powers; they can
neither add to nor take from conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission,
naturalizationand residence of aliens in the United States or the several states."' 96
S. Ct. at 938 n.6 (emphasis added by the Court) quoting from Takahasi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948). Takahashi was also decided on equal protection
grounds. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
26. 96 S. Ct. at 936.
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aliens who have no federal right to employment within the
country; even if such local regulation has some purely
speculative and indirect impact on immigration, it does
not thereby become a constitutionally proscribed regulation of immigration that Congress itself would be powerless to authorize or approve. Thus, absent congressional
action, § 2805 would not be an invalid state incursion on
27
federal power.

Thus, having quickly disposed of the contention that the
statute was an invalid incursion on a federal power, the Court
turned its attention to whether the law had been pre-empted
by the Supremacy Clause. Even where the state regulation was
not in a field exclusively reserved to the federal government by
the Constitution, such a statute, although harmonious with
federal regulation, may nevertheless be invalidated under the
Supremacy Clause."'
27. Id.
California courts in previous litigation comprehensively reviewed the extent
and
impact of illegal aliens on the employment opportunities of domestic labor. Although
appreciating the problem, relief.was denied because it was seen as a federal issue.
See,
Larez v. Oberti, 23 Cal. App. 3d 217, 100 Cal. Rptr. 57 .(1972); Cobos v.
Mello-dy
Ranch, 20 Cal. App. 3d 947, 98 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1971); Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch,
9 Cal.
App. 3d 588, 596-97, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 448-49 (1970). See generally Cardenas,
United
States Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: A Historical Perspective, 2 CHICANO
L.
REV. 66, 79-89 (1975); Note, State Regulation of the Employment
of Illegal Aliens:
A ConstitutionalApproach, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 565 (1973).
In 1971, when 595,000 Californians were unemployed (7.4% of the state's labor
force, there were between 200,000 and 300,000 illegal aliens employed in California
earning approximately $100 million in wages. Petitioner's Brief at 13-16, De Canas
v.
Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976).
See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976), setting
limits
on Congress' plenary power over commerce: "Congress may not exercise its
power to
regulate commerce so as to force directly upon states its choices as to how
essential
decisions regarding conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made."
Id.
at 2475.
28. 96 S. Ct. at 936.
See Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); San Diego Unions v. Garmon,
353
U.S. 26 (1957) and 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
In Guss the state court held that the employer engaged in unfair labor practices
and in Garmon the state court enjoined a union from picketing. The Guss and Garmon
opinions created a regulatory vacuum when they held that states could not
govern
labor relations subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
even
though the Board refused to exercise its power.
According to the De Canas Court, Guss and Garmon recognize that where
Congress requires "national uniformity of regulation, Congress may exercise
power to
exclude an), state regulation, even if harmonious." 96 S. Ct. at 938 n.7. In
Guss the
Court noted that "where federal power has been delegated but lies dormant and
unexercised, . . . the States' power to act with respect to matters of local concern
is not
necessarily superseded. But in each case the question is one of congressional
intent."
353 U.S. at 10-11. But see note 44 and accompanying text infra.

19771

DE CANAS v. BICA

Under the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court has
evolved two basic approaches in determining the validity of the
2
specific state laws in question. " In the areas where Congress
has required national uniformity, the "occupation" approach
renders state regulation invalid even though the state scheme
does not impair, but enhances and aids the achievement of
federal goals.3 The "conflict" approach permits the states to
regulate an area covered by comprehensive federal legislation,
provided that it does not conflict or impair the federal
scheme." For a state statute to be constitutionally upheld in
an area of concurrent jurisdiction, the law must pass both of
these tests.2
In applying the test of occupation, the exercise of federal
3
supremacy is not lightly to be presumed. " A judicial preemption decision on the basis of congressional intent to occupy
the field requires "persuasive reasons-either that the nature
of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion or
34
that Congress has unmistakenly so ordained."
Here, the Court believed that "the nature of the subject
matter" (regulation of employment of illegal aliens) did not
35
require the conclusion of pre-emption since section 2805 was
clearly within a state's police power to protect lawfully em36
ployed workers within the state. The Court noted that the law
29. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Preemption Doctrine]. "An absolute distinction between the two concepts should not
be inferred. Occupation of the field implies that any state regulation would conflict
either with the federal statute's terms or operation, or with congressional intent." Id.
at 626 n.20. Cf. J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
286-89 (1975), breaking down at least nine rationales for pre-emption; all arguably
subcategories of "occupation" and "conflict."
30. Note, Preemption Doctrine, supra note 29, at 625, 642-46. See note 28 supra.
This doctrine can be traced to the early commerce clause case of Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 298, 319, 320 (1851).
31. Note, Preemption Doctrine, supra note 29, at 626, 646-49. See note 39 and
text accompanying notes 60-65 infra.
32. 96 S. Ct. at 937 n.5.
33. New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) citing
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952). See note 47 infra.
34. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963).
Florida growers sought to market avocados certified as mature under federal regulations, but prohibited as immature under California code. The Court affirmed the state
regulation.
35. 96 S. Ct. at 937.
36. Id. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976) is a limited labor statute
designed to protect California wage-earners. The statute is an incidental part of comprehensive California state labor legislation which regulates a variety of employer
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attempted "to protect California's fiscal interests and lawfully
resident labor force from the deleterious [economic effects]
resulting from the employment of illegal aliens."37
Nor did it appear that 'Congress has unmistakenly so
ordained"' that pre-emption is required.3" The De Canas Court
noted that pre-emption by a finding of "occupation" has been
disparaged." The Court refused to presume that Congress, in
enacting the INA intended to oust state authority to regulate
the employment relationship in a manner consistent with federal laws"° and insisted that only a demonstration of complete
ouster would justify the pre-emption conclusion.4 ' In this case,
related activities. This includes the use of child labor, §§ 1171-1204; standards
related
to wages, §§ 200-277; and health and safety standards, §§ 6300-6320, among
others.
See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
37. 96 S. Ct. at 937.
The Petitioners' Brief at 8 notes that illegal aliens: (1) take jobs which normally
would be filled by American citizens; (2) depress the wages and impair
the working
conditions of American citizens; (3) increase the burden of American
taxpayers
through added welfare costs; (4) reduce the effectiveness of employee organizations;
(5) secure jobs, services, and resources directly and indirectly from many
federal and
state programs, thus diverting scarce resources from American citizens; and
(6) constitute for employers an unskilled group rich for exploitation-aggressive,
enterprising
workers with low-wage demands. See remarks of Robert Brown, Associate
Manpower
Administrator, U.S. Training and Employment Services, Department of
Labor, in
Hearings on "Illegal Aliens" before Subcomm. No. 1, Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, pts. 1-5, pt. 5 at 1356 (1972). See Petitioner's Brief,
8-13.
38. 96 S. Ct. at 937, quoting from Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
39. 96 S. Ct. at 938 n.8. The Court referred to Justice Stone's dissent in
Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941):
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often repeated
formula that Congress by "occupying the field" has excluded from it all
state legislation. Every act of Congress occupies some field, but we must
know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it has precluded
a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the Constitution.
To discover the boundaries we look to the federal statute itself, read in
the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative history.
312 U.S. at 78-79. See note 8 supra.
Several commentators have suggested that the only proper method of pre-emption
analysis lies in the "conflict" approach because of the inherent pitfalls of the
discernment of legislative intent in the "occupation" branch of the doctrine. See,
e.g., Note,
Preemptionas a PreferentialGround: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN.
L. REV.
208, 209-10 (1959); HART & SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 97-102 (mimeograph of tentative edition,
1958).
40. 96 S. Ct. at 937.
41. Id. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), the Court
pointed
out that the United States Warehouse Act (39 Stat. 486 (1916), as amended,
7 U.S.C.
§§ 241-73 (1958)) provides that "the power, jurisdiction and authority conferred
[by
this Act] . . .shall be exclusive .... " 331 U.S. at 224. This demonstrates
a conscious attempt to anticipate and resolve pre-emption issues. Even with such
explicitness, the scope of exclusion depends on the extent of powers conferred
by the
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there was no "specific indication in either the wording or the
legislative history of the INA that Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in
43
general,"2 or the employment of aliens in particular."
act-determinable only in light of the policy beyond its text, i.e., history and background. Rice viewed the Warehouse Act as an attempt to increase negotiability of
warehouse receipts by standardizing warehouse operations. On the assumption that
the federal administrator had control over matters affecting negotiability, the Court
precluded state regulation of activities subject to any form of federal control, except
to the extent it fails to cover the field or makes express exception in favor of state
law. 331 U.S. at 234.
42. The Court adds:
Of course, state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if
it imposes burdens not contemplated by Congress . . . . But California
Code § 2805 appears to be designed to protect the opportunities of lawfully admitted aliens for obtaining and holding jobs, rather than to add
to their burdens. The question whether § 2805(a) nevertheless in fact
imposes burdens bringing it into conflict with the INA is open for inquiry
on remand.
96. S. Ct. at 938 n.6. See text accompanying notes 60 & 88 infra.
43. 96 S. Ct. at 937-38. See generally Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 37680 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
Yick Wo invalidated a San Francisco ordinance regulating the operation of laundries which was discriminately enforced against Chinese operators. The Court held
that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a State may not "deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 118 U.S. at 369. See also, Civil Rights
Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (1870), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
Truax voided an Arizona law requiring all employers of more than five workers to
hire at least eighty percent qualified electors or native-born citizens. The Court declared that Raich, being lawfully admitted under federal law, had a federal privilege
to enter and abide in any state in the Union and that this privilege carried with it the
"right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community," a denial of
which right would make the Fourteenth Amendment "a barren form of words." 239
U.S. at 41.
Graham involved Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes restricting welfare payments
to citizens or long time resident aliens. The Pennsylvannia fund involved no federal
monies. 403 U.S. at 365. The special public-interest doctrine is eroded as the Court
says, "the Court has now rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon
whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a "right" or as a "privilege". Id.
at 374. The statutes were invalidated on both equal protection grounds and on the
ground they encroach upon exclusive federal power. Id. at 380. Arizona suggested that
its residency requirement for aliens was actually authorized by federal law. Id. The
Court answered, "Although the Federal Government admittedly has broad constitutional power [to regulate immigration and naturalization], Congress does not have
the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal ProtectionClause."
Id. at 382 (emphasis added). "Classifications based on alienage . . . are inherently
suspect" because "[alliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." Id. at 372.
Cf. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (voiding a Connecticut statute which
excluded aliens from the practice of law); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)
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The Court further decided that even lacking such a specific intent, no pre-emptive intent can be inferred merely from
the scope and detail of the INA." First, the employment of
illegal aliens was not "plainly within the central aim" of federal
regulation 5 because the central focus of the Act is with the
terms and conditions of admission and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country." Second, the comprehensiveness of the INA is to be expected in light of the nature
and complexity of the subject, "completely apart from any
question of pre-emptive intent."47
The Court next examined the contention that Congress
specifically and intentionally declined to punish employers of
illegal aliens,48 saying that it was "at best evidence of a peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants."49 Although the Court conceded that Congress explicitly exempted
employers of illegal aliens from the crime of harboring, it noted
(invalidating on equal protection grounds a New York statute which limited competitive civil service positions to citizens); text accompanying note 85 infra. See also notes
88 & 94 infra.
For cases dealing with equal protection and executive or congressional
discrimination against aliens, see Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895 (1976)
and Mathews v. Diaz, 96 S. Ct. 1883 (1976).
44. 96 S. Ct. at 938 & n.7. Mr. Justice Brennan rejected the lower court's reliance
on Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957) and San Diego Union v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1959). See note 28 supra. The distinguishing feature was a specific provision
in the federal act whereby the NLRB could, by agreement with the state, allow the
state some regulatory authority. As the condition of agreement was not met, the Court
refused to allow state action in an area over which the NLRB had declined jurisdiction.
There, the "danger of conflict" within the "central aim of federal regulation" was too
great. 359 U.S. at 244.
45. 96 S. Ct. at 938.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 938. The Court refers to New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino,
413 U.S. 405 (1973), wherein the Court rejected the
contention that pre-emption [of state regulations] is to be inferred
merely from the comprehensive character of the federal work incentive
provisions. . . . The subjects of modem social and regulatory legislation
often by their very nature require intricate and complex responses from
the Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its enactment
as the exclusive means of meeting the problem. Given the complexity of
the matter addressed by Congress . . . a detailed statutory scheme was
both likely and appropriate, completely apart from any question of preemptive intent.
Id. at 415.
48. A provision of the INA declares it a felony wilfully or knowingly to conceal,
harbor or shield illegal entrants, subject to the proviso that "employment (including
the usual and normal practicesincident to employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring. " 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
49. 96 S. Ct. at 939.
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that such immunization did not suggest an exemption from the
crime of employment of illegal aliens."
Finally, under the test of occupation, the Court found
"evidence in the form of the 1974 Amendment to the Farm
5
Labor Contractor Registration Act (FLCRA) ' that Congress
with federal
intended that States may, to the extent consistent
2 The amendlaw, regulate the employment of illegal3 aliens. 5
5
ments brought to bear administrative, criminal, " and civil
liabilities5 5 upon farm labor contractors who knowingly recruit
or employ any "alien not lawfully admitted for permanent residence or not authorized by the Attorney General to accept
employment." 6 Of particular significance to the Court was an
express saving clause which provided: "This Chapter and provisions contained herein are intended to supplement State
action and compliance with this Chapter shall not excuse anyone from compliance with appropriate State law and
7 Although the employers contended that the
regulation.""
FLCRA (a much more recent declaration of Congressional intent than the INA) should be limited narrowly to agricultural
employment,5" whereas section 2085 applied to all employers,
the Court felt that there was persuasive evidence that Congress
believed the illegal alien employment problem did not yet require uniform national rules and hence was an appropriate area
59
for state regulation.
50. Id. & n.9.
51. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-53 (1970).
52. 96 S. Ct. at 939.
§ 2044(b)(6)
53. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2044(b)(6) (Supp. 1976), amending 7 U.S.C.A.
(1973).
54. Id. § 2048, amending 7 U.S.C.A. § 2048 (1973).
55. Id. § 2050a, amending 7 U.S.C.A. § 2050 (1973).
56. Id. § 2045(f), amending 7 U.S.C.A. § 2045 (1973).
added
57. 7 U.S.C. § 2051 (1970) quoted by the Court, 96 S. Ct. at 939 (emphasis
by the Court).
(1976).
58. Brief for Respondent at 20, De Canas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933
312 U.S. 52
Davidowitz,
v.
Hines
that
indicated
59. 96 S. Ct. at 939. The Court
497 (1956), relied on
U.S.
350
Nelson,
v.
Pennsylvania
and
supra)
8
note
(see
(1941)
by the employers, are fully consistent with its opinion.
act proscribing
In Nelson, the Smith Act was held to supersede a state sedition
497.
at
U.S.
the same conduct. 350
Although both Hines and Nelson pre-empted state law, there the state encroachindication that
ments were in the specific field of federal regulation. Here, there is no
was there affirmCongress intended to preclude state law. In neither Hines nor Nelson
in De Canas. Both
ative evidence that Congress sanctioned concurrent state action as
of immiHines and Nelson involved areas of predominant federal interest in the fields
in
interest
federal
similar
a
be
to
appear
not
does
There
affairs.
gration and foreign
ineligible to work.
state regulation of local problems involving persons already declared
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The Court next examined the second test for invalidating
state laws under the Supremacy Clause, the conflict test. Although it appeared that Congress had not manifested an intent
to "occupy the field," but rather that the INA contemplates
some room for state legislation,'" the Court said that a state
statute may still be unconstitutional under the Supremacy
Clause if it stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the purpose and objectives of the INA." The parameters of such a test are that absent repealing or exclusivity
provisions, conflicting law should be pre-empted "only to the
extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the
federal law, since the proper approach is to reconcile the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than
holding [the state scheme] completely ousted." 2 Referring to
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,"3 the Court said,
"[Sitate regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is
impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress . . .. "I' At this point the Court indicated
that the conflict test could not be considered since there was a
question of statutory construction that had to be resolved by
the California courts. 5
Finally, the state statutes in Hines and Nelson imposed burdens on lawful residents
albeit aliens and thus conflicted with federal laws and policies. 96 S. Ct. at 940.
60. 96 S. Ct. at 941.
61. Id. at 940.
62. Id. at 937 n.5 citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414
U.S. 117, 127 (1973) quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 361,
357 (1963).
Merrill Lynch involved a California law that forfeiture clauses in employee profit
sharing plans are invalid as a restraint of trade. The Court said that such clauses,
promulgated as self-regulatory measures pursuant to the Security Exchange Act of
1934, do not fall under the Exchange's mandate to protect the investing public and to
insure uniform national trade practices. Here, California's strong policy of protecting
its wage earners from undesirable economic pressures affecting employment relationships prevails as no interference with the federal regulatory scheme was found. In
addition, the Court found explicit Congressional intent to affirm state policies. 414
U.S. at 139-40 & 160.
Silver involved conflicting federal regulatory schemes. Silver brought action on
due process and anti-trust grounds when the Exchange denied him services. The Court
determined that the Securities Exchange Act did not create a duty of Exchange selfregulation so pervasive as to constitute an implied repealer of due process principles
and anti-trust laws. 373 U.S. at 357-61.
See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
63. 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
64. 96 S. Ct. at 938 n.6 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 940.
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6
Another California case, Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard,"
stated that the statute "does or could affect immigration in
several ways," 7 in that the phrases "illegal alien" and "alien
not entitled to work" are not the same as "alien not entitled
to lawful residence."6 Some aliens not entitled to lawful resi69
dence are authorized by federal law to work. The Dolores
court said that section 2805, as written, would make employers
of people authorized to work but not lawful residents, liable to
both civil and criminal prosecution. Thus, the Dolores court
found section 2805 pre-empted not only from the "occupied
field" approch, 7' but also from the "conflict" approach as an
encroachment upon and interference with a congressional
scheme. 2
The petitioners in De Canas conceded at oral argument
that section 2805 on its face unconstitutionally conflicts with
federal law. They argued, however, that a subsequent administrative regulation limits construction of section 2805 and
aaves it by providing that "[a]n alien entitled to lawful residence shall mean any non-citizen . . .who is in possession of
[any] document issued by the United States Immigration and
74
Naturalization Service which authorizes him to work." It did
66. 40 Cal. App. 3d 673, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1974).
67. Id. at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43.
68. Trial court's memorandum opinion, No. 061928 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles
County, Cal., Mar. 21, 1972).
69. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 688, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 444. The Dolores court noted that
these aliens are designated as "nonimmigrants," in the INA. "[They] include diplomats, officers and employees of foreign governments, business visitors and tourists,
naval and aircraft crewmen, investors, students, media representatives, professors and
research assistants, a fiance(e) of a United States citizen, and executive employees."

Id.
70. See notes 1 & 69 supra and accompanying text. See also note 94 infra.
71. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 686-87, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
72. 1M. at 688-89, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 443-44.
73. 96 S. Ct. at 940.
74. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 8, § 16209 (1975). (The Administrative Regulations are
promulgated by the California Director of Industrial Relations.) See note 89 infra.
CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 8, § 16209.6 defines "adverse effect on lawful resident workers" (see CAL. LABOR CODE § 2805(a), (West Supp. 1976), text accompanying note 1
supra as:
(a) Employment in any category not on Schedule A of Labor Department of Regulations 29 C.F.R. § 60.7.
(b) Payment by an employer to employee of less than federal or
state minimum wage whichever is higher.
29 C.F.R. § 60.7 (1976) includes "Group 1"-persons with advanced degrees in:
Dietetics; Medicine & Surgery; Nursing; Pharmacy; Physical Therapy; and "Group
2"-persons with Bachelor degrees or equivalent in: Dietectics; Nursing; Pharmacy;
Physical Therapy." Schedule A also includes a third group: "persons of any religion
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not appear to the Court that these administrative regulations
were applied in the lower courts,75 and accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the California courts
for a determination of the effect of the administrative regulations on the construction of section 2805 and the extent to
which section 2805, as construed, conflicted with the INA.78
The De Canas decision is consistent with a line of recent
cases favorable to state interests, 7 suggesting that where Congress has not clearly intended to pre-empt, or where a conflict
is unripe or peripheral to the purpose of the federal statute,
state legislation will be allowed to stand."
The Court could have declined to find any Congressional
intent to allow state action in De Canas. Many unsuccessful
bills have been proposed to amend the INA on the precise issue
of penalizing employers of illegal aliens.7" What Congress has
not permitted itself to rule on, the Court has permitted states
to act on.80
whose regular profession or occupation is to conduct religious services or other religious
activities which he is authorized by his denomination to perform and who seek
admittance to the United States to engage in such work."
75. 96 S. Ct. at 941 n.12.
76. Id. at 941.
77. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973);
New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
78. Note, The PreemptionDoctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalismand the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 653 (1975).
79. In 1972 and 1973 the House passed H.R. 16188 and H.R. 982 respectively;
both died when the Senate took no action. Atleast four bills on this issue have been
before the 94th Congress-H.R. 982, H.R. 3883, H.R. 6732 and H.R. 251. See generally
Hearingson "Illegal Aliens" before Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenshipand International Law of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8 at 3,
10, 17, & 144 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
These bills were consolidated into H.R. 8713 in September, 1975. H.R. REP. No.
506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Report]. The bill faces a
formidable obstacle in that Sen. James 0. Eastland, chairman of both the Senate
Judiciary Committee and its Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee, refuses
to take action on any illegal alien bill unless it also authorizes importation of foreign
workers whenever U.S. workers cannot be found to do the work.
Eastland's subcommittee began hearings on March 17, 1976, on S.3074 providing
for non-immigrant labor as well as penalties for employers who knowingly hire illegal
aliens.
80. This is the better policy according to various commentators. To pre-empt
where Congress is silent and has not "covered the field" leaves a gap in needed regulation and leaves the state powerless to fill it. Permitting state regulation still allows
Congress the option to reverse the Court legislatively. Note, The PreemptionDoctrine:
Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 654
(1975).
Many of the Court's pre-emption decisions have been condemned as unwarranted
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Although the Court said that the illegal alien problem
remains a local issue since Congress has not required a uniform
national scheme of regulation,"' the problem is arguably at
least regional if not national in scope, requiring a sensitive
balancing of interests.2 When individual states regulate the
employment of illegal aliens with varying degrees of stringency
and timeliness, mass interstate exoduses and influxes of illegal
aliens may be expected to severely affect neighboring states'
economies. In the federal arena, the interest of illegal aliens
"who have developed substantial equities" is given weight in
proposed amnesty provisions.83 Such power is prohibited to the
states. 4 If an amnesty provision is enacted permitting long
time illegal aliens to legalize their status over a one year grace
period, conflicting state provisions burdening such aliens' right
to a livelihood must surely be suspended, if not voided, as being
an encroachment on the exclusive federal power to regulate
immigration.5 The Court held, however, that absent congressional action, such potential conflict is purely speculative and
not a bar."
The major charge against a provision like section 2805 is
that employers, to avoid the possibility of prosecution, might
refuse to hire workers with a foreign accent, or Spanish or Asian
or other minority surname, even if they are U.S. citizens.87
substitution of judicial wisdom for that of Congress. Note, Preemptionas a Preferential
Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
81. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
82. See generally Hearings, supra note 79.
The INS estimates that H.R. 982 would create a total of 1,000,000 jobs-166,000
in the northeast; 120,000 in the southeast; 156,000 in the northwest; 558,000 in the
southwest. Id. at 123.
In 1974 the INS apprehended 788,145 aliens and expelled 737,564 aliens. Report,
supra note 79, at 4.
83. This was not before the Court. H.R. 8713 contained a limited amnesty provision for illegal aliens in the country since 1968. Applications for status adjustment
must be filed within a year after the bill's enactment and the alien would be allowed
to work while his application was being processed. Report, supra note 79, at 11 & 16.
Even this provision is criticized as too limited, inadequate, inhumane and unconscionable as separating families by forcing a mass exodus of literally millions of men,
women and children. Testimony of Msgr. G.G. Higgins, Secretary for U.S. Catholic
Conference, Hearings, supra note 79, at 297-314. Amnesty for illegal aliens in the
country since 1973 is suggested. Id. at 299.
84. Power to regulate immigration is exclusively federal. See note 25 supra.
85. Id. But see California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 729-33, 735-38 (1949), a 5-4
decision on interstate commerce.
86. 96 S. Ct. at 936.
87. Acknowledging fears of discriminatory abuses, H.R. 8713 authorized the
Attorney General to bring suit against individual employers "when he has reasonable
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Thus, the statute may encourage, unwittingly, of course, violations of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.8 Even if documentation is required to be
presented by all applicants 9 (to allay equal protection and due
process arguments), what happens if the employer does not like
the looks of the documentation presented? Whatever documentation is required could easily be counterfeited. 0 Does the
employer hire the applicant anyway or refuse to do so on the
ground that he suspects fraudulent documentation has been
presented?"' Should the employer protect himself by retaining
cause to believe that an employer has engaged in employment discrimination based
on national origin." Report, supra note 79, at 16. Similar authority is delegated to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but
must be based on evidence of a pattern of practice or on an individual complaint. Id.
at 33.
88. The Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976), held that
a fifth and fourteenth amendment attack on a statute neutral on its face but having a
disproportionately discriminatory impact, does not by itself require a strict Title VII
standard of scrutiny. A discriminatory purpose must be shown. It should be noted,
however, that the action in Davis was commenced in 1970, and so the Court did not
apply the Civil Rights Act of 1972 which extended the stricter standards of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. II 1972)) to
include "governments," "governmental agencies," and "political subdivisions."
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. 11 1972))
prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Under Title VII employment practices having disproportionate impact alone,
without proof of discriminatory purpose, creates a prima facie case. Such employment
practices require a showing of substantial job relatedness to be sustained. See Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
However, the Court has held that Title VII does not bar employment discrimination that is based on citizenship as against lawful aliens. See note 94 infra.
89. "Universal national identifier" documentation has been vigorously objected
to. Statement of David Carliner in behalf of American Civil Liberties Union, Hearings,
supra note 79, at 295.
CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 8, § 16209.1-.2 provides that the employer "shall make inquiry" of the applicant or employee as to citizenship or alienage (emphasis added). If
the applicant or employee claims to be a citizen, "he may be employed or continued
[to be employed] upon signing a declaration under penalty of perjury that he is a
citizen of the United States." Id. § 16209.3. Sections 16209.4-.5 provide that if the
applicant or employee acknowledges that he is an alien, "he shall be requested to
produce a document which shows that he is entitled to reside in the United States."
If documentation is not furnished in three days, and the alien is in fact illegal, the
employer is presumed to have knowledge of the employee's unlawful resident status
(emphasis added).
See note 91 infra.
90. "Counterfeit documents are so available now and easy to get that the bottom
has fallen out of the market and the price has fallen 50 percent." Testimony of Hon.
L.F. Chapman, Jr., Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Hearings,
supra note 79, at 340.
91. Although CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 8, § 16209.3 makes misrepresentation of U.S.
citizenship a perjury, there is no similar provision for misrepresentation of lawful
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photocopies of all documentation submitted? If the documents
are in fact fraudulent, would the fact that he tried to insulate
himself by photocopying it be indicative of his "knowledge" of
illegality? The issue here is one of due process and vagueness.
Can the employer use the excuse of fraudulent documentation
to cover his own racial, ethnic or anti-union prejudice?"
Clearly, the potential for abuse is great. 3 The question is
whether the state's purpose in protecting its economy is sufficiently compelling to justify an arguably inadequate (counterfeit documentation) or over-effective (mass poverty-exodus to
other states) deterrent which is highly likely to promote invidious discrimination based on alienage or national origin. Equal
protection questions may arise if the statute has the effect of
promoting discrimination against9 4"suspect" classes and a
nexus to state action is established.
residence or of lawful authorization to accept employment. This weakness may operate
as a state enforcement loophole. Such misrepresentation is a felony under 18 U.S.C. §
1546 (1970).
Another weakness in the California Code is that although an indicia of bona fide
effort is retained by the employer in the statement of employee's citizenship, no parallel indicia is required to be retained in providing proof that proper inquiry was made
and satisfied as to an alien's status. See note 89 supra.
92. Testimony of Hon. B.F. Sisk, Member of the House from California,
Hearings, supra note 79, at 147-48.
United Farm Workers President Cesar Chavez has expressed concern that the
state and proposed federal legislation could lead to discrimination against MexicanAmericans, although he had previously favored the legislation as preventing employers
from using illegal aliens as strike breakers. Gottron, Illegal Alien Curbs: House Action
Stalled, 1976 CONG. QUARTERLY, 641 (1976).
93. Classifications based on alienage, a discrete and insular minority, are inherently suspect. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
94. State action may be found from the statute's effect on state employment
practices. Absent such evidence, it is highly unlikely that enacting or enforcing the
statute itself is sufficient state action to provide an equal protection nexus. The distinction between state action and private action is crucial, since state action affecting
discrimination on the basis of alienage is subject to strict scrutiny. See notes 42-43 and
text accompanying notes 63 and 88 supra.
Where private employers discriminate against aliens, the Supreme Court has said:
Certainly it would be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
aliens because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin-for example
by hiring aliens of Anglo-Saxon background but refusing to hire those of
Mexican or Spanish ancestry. Aliens are protected from illegal discrimination under the [EEOA-42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)], but nothing in the
Act makes it illegal to discriminateon the basis of citizenship or alienage.
Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973) (emphasis added). Thus, the strict
Title VII standards are not applicable.
In Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974), the same
issue was argued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Section 1981 provides in pertinent
part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
" In light of detailed legislative history the section
in every State and Territory ....
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The immediate question on De Canas' remand-the ambiguity of the phrase "alien not entitled to lawful residence,"9
poses no substantial obstacle that careful legislative drafting
cannot avoid." The significance of De Canas is that it has
constitutionally sanctioned state legislative regulation of illegal alien employment. It is the technique used and the resulting license to discriminate that may still be objectionable. Nevertheless, in the absence of congressional action, it is certain
that many states will effectuate similar employment statutes
to "protect the vital state interests" involved. 7
Yi-Tze Seth Wu
was held applicable to aliens as against both state action and private discrimination
in employment.
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886), discussed in note 43 supra,
holding that a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person." Cf Runyon v. McCrary,
96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976) (applying 42 U.S.C. 1981 in prohibiting discrimination in the
making and enforcement of private contracts).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) for an alternative ad hoc remedy:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or territory, subjects or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
(Emphasis added.)
95. There are three classes of aliens not authorized for employment in the United
States: (1) Illegal aliens who did not legally enter the country and possess no indicia
of lawful residence; (2) Illegal aliens who lawfully entered the country and possess
documentation of such lawful entry, but who illegally overstayed their visit; and (3)
Aliens who are lawfully in the country with documentation but who are not authorized
to work or who work in excess of their authorization.
See also note 69 and accompanying text supra.
96. CAL. LABOR CODE § 2805(a) (West 1976), see text accompanying note 1 supra,
could be amended to read:
No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to
lawful residence, or who is not authorized by law to accept employment,
if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.
However, Brief for Respondent at 10-15, Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 40 Cal. App.
3d 673, 115 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1974), lists some situations where an alien entitled to
residence, or is not otherwise deportable, may not be able to obtain any legitimizing
documentaton of residence nor any "work permit" as such. To avoid an "unduly
burdensome effect" on such aliens-presumably authorized to earn a living, some
verification procedure should be available to them.
97. Other states have expressed similar concerns by enacting comparable legisla-

tion. See

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

4409 (1974).

§ 31-51k (West Supp. 1976);

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 21-

BAIL-TO FACILITATE MEANINGFUL APPELLATE
REVIEW OF A DENIAL OF A MOTION FOR BAIL
PENDING APPEAL, TRIAL COURT MUST ARTICULATE
REASONS IN SUPPORT OF THE DENIAL-In re Podesto,
15 Cal. 3d 921, 544 P.2d 1297, 127 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1976).
In August, 1974, Alan Podesto was stopped for a traffic
violation. A search of the passenger area of Podesto's automobile resulted in the discovery of a small quantity of marijuana
debris which led to a search of the trunk where 85 pounds of
marijuana was found.' Podesto was arrested and charged with
possession of marijuana for sale and sale of marijuana.' At the
initial hearing before a magistrate the evidence was suppressed, but upon refiling by the People the evidence was admitted. Podesto subsequently pleaded guilty to the charge of
possession of marijuana for sale. After being sentenced to state
prison, an appeal was entered on the basis of illegal search and
seizure.3
After sentencing the defendant sought release on bail
pending appeal, arguing that his appearance at all proceedings,
an available job opportunity, and a strong possibility of a reversal of the conviction on appeal favored granting bail.' The trial
court summarily denied bail stating in part: "Well, I'm not
intending to cite all the reasons but we'll observe that sentence
was imposed in [this] case and one of the reasons was because
of the threat involved." 5 The court of appeal likewise denied
the defendant's application for bail pending appeal.
In an original habeas corpus proceeding before the California Supreme Court, Podesto claimed an absolute right to bail
pending appeal from a conviction. The court held that denial
of bail pending appeal is within the discretion of the trial court,
but that in the future such a denial must be accompanied by
1. In re Podesto, 15 Cal. 3d 921, 544 P.2d 1297, 127 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1976).
2. Podesto was charged with violations of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11359,
11360 (West 1975).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(m) (West Supp. 1976) states in part: "A defendant
may seek further review of the validity of a search or seizure on appeal from a conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment is predicated upon a plea of guilty."
4. 15 Cal. 3d at 928 n.4, 544 P.2d at 1300 n.4, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 100 n.4.
5. Id. at 927 n.3, 544 P.2d at 1300 n.3, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 100 n.3.
It was not clear to the California Supreme Court what the trial court meant by
the "threat," however it was inferred that the trial court was probably referring to the
probation report which described the defendant as a "threat to the community." Id.
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a brief statement of the reasons for denial.'
Podesto challenged the denial of bail pending appeal on
three grounds: first, that Penal Code section 1272,1 which
makes post-conviction bail a matter of judicial discretion, is in
conflict with article I section 12 of the California Constitution;'
second, that section 1272 violates the equal protection clauses
of the federal and state constitutions;9 and third, that the trial
court in denying bail abused its discretion under section 1272.10

In response to the defendant's first argument the California Supreme Court reviewed section 1272 which provides that
post-conviction bail is available in non-capital felony cases
where imprisonment is imposed "as a matter of discretion.""
Podesto argued that the application of section 1272 was violative of article I section 12 of the California Constitution.,' Although previous California Supreme Court rulings held that
the state constitutional right to bail in non-capital offenses
6. The court denied Podesto's habeas corpus motion, but preserved his right to
refile for bail and have the case considered in light of this decision. Id. at 938, 544 P.2d
at 1308, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1272 (West 1970) provides:
After conviction of an offense not punishable with death, a defendant
who has made application for probation or who has appealed may be
admitted to bail:
1. As a matter of right, before judgment is pronounced pending
application for probation in cases of misdemeanors, or when the appeal
is from a judgment imposing a fine only.
2. As a matter of right, before judgment is pronounced pending
application for probation in cases of misdemeanors, or when the appeal
is from a judgment imposing imprisonment in cases of misdemeanors.
3. As a matter of discretion in all other cases.
8. 15 Cal. 3d at 929, 544 P.2d at 1301, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12 states in part: "A person shall be released on bail by
sufficient sureties, except for capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great."
Prior to November, 1974, article I section 6 of the California Constitution dealt
with the right to bail. A constitutional amendment passed by the voters of California
in November, 1974, resulted in a reorganization of article I, and section 6 was readopted as section 12. The earlier version of section 6 had stated in part: "All persons
shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is
evident or the presumption great." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (West 1954).
The Podesto court treated section 12 as if it were identical to the prior section 6,
indicating that the court considered the changes minor and without substantial impact
on the right to bail. 15 Cal. 3d at 929 n.6, 544 P.2d at 1301 n.6, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 101
n.6.
9. Id. at 931, 544 P.2d at 1303, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
10. Id. at 933, 544 P.2d at 1304, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1272 (West 1970). See note 7 supra.
12. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12. See note 8 supra.
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applies only before conviction," Podesto claimed that these
decisions were invalidated by In re Underwood, 4 a 1973 California Supreme Court case. In Underwood the court characterized bail as an assurance that the defendant will be in court
"when his presence is required, whether before or after conviction."' Podesto contended that this language supported his
constitutional interpretation that the right to bail is available
in non-capital cases after conviction, and that section 1272, by
leaving the matter of bail to the court's discretion, violated the
California Constitution.
The Podesto court distinguished the Underwood decision
on the grounds that it dealt exclusively with the right to preconviction bail and whether this right may be denied to a defendant who is characterized as a threat to public safety.'" The
court noted that the Underwood decision had recognized that
there is a substantial difference between pre-conviction and
post-conviction bail. 7
Podesto relied on In re Law 8 in determining that there is
no constitutional right to post-conviction bail. In re Law, a
decision subsequent to Underwood, held that a parolee detained for a parole violation had no absolute right to bail. The
Law court focused on article I section 12 of the California Constitution 0 in ultimately deciding that the right to bail is a preconviction right.' Section 12 provides for bail as a matter of
right for all persons charged with criminal offenses except those
charged with "capital crimes when facts are evident or the
presumption great." The Law court read this limitation on bail
as indicating that section 12 applies only to persons whose guilt
has not been conclusively established. It was reasoned that it
would make no sense to apply this standard for bail to those
13. See In re Scaggs, 47 Cal. 2d 416, 418, 303 P.2d 1009, 1010 (1956); Ex parte
Brown, 68 Cal. 176, 177, 8 P. 829, 830 (1885); Ex parte Voll, 41 Cal. 29, 31-33 (1871).
14. 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973).
15. Id. at 348, 508 P.2d at 723, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (emphasis added).
16. 15 Cal. 3d at 930, 544 P.2d at 1302, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
17. The Underwood court ruled that pre-conviction bail may not be denied solely
on the grounds that the defendant may pose a danger to the community. 9 Cal. 3d at
350, 508 P.2d at 724, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 404. The Underwood court stated that "the right
to bail pending appeal is substantially different from the right to bail pending trial."
Id. at 347 n.1, 508 P.2d at 724 n.1, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.1.
18. 10 Cal. 3d 21, 513 P.2d 621, 109 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1973).
19. 15 Cal. 3d at 930-31, 544 P.2d at 1302-03, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03.
20. At the time of the Law decision, the bail section was still section 6. See note
8 supra.
21. 10 Cal. 3d at 25-26, 513 P.2d at 624, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
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who have been convicted because their guilt has been finally
established and there is no longer a need to speculate on the
degree of proof or presumption against them.22 Accordingly, the
Podesto court ruled that there is no conflict between section
1272 and article I section 12 of the California Constitution since
article I section 12 deals with bailbefore conviction and section
1272 deals with bail after conviction.
The Podesto court also ruled against the defendant's second contention that section 1272 is violative of the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Podesto
argued that, since under section 1272 a convicted misdemeanant facing imprisonment has an absolute right to bail while bail
for a convicted felon facing imprisonment is discretionary, the
disparate treatment of the two classes of offenders is discriminatory and constitutes a denial of equal protection. In considering this argument the court cited In re King23 for the proposition that the state may not arbitrarily discriminate between
groups of individuals, but it may draw distinctions that bear a
"rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose. '
4
In cases where "fundamental interests"25 are involved the
state has the burden of proving that the statute is necessary to
promote a compelling state interest and that the classification
created is necessary to achieve this legitimate state interest."
Podesto claimed that since this classification affected his liberty, a fundamental constitutional right, the "strict scrutiny"
equal protection standard was the proper constitutional guideline. The court, assuming arguendo that the strict scrutiny
standard applied,2 7 determined that the classificatory scheme
22. Id.
23. 3 Cal. 3d 226, 474 P.2d 983, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1970).
24. 15 Cal. 3d at 932, 544 P.2d at 1303, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
25. Fundamental interests are those rights which are explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution. See Roe v. Wade, 401 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that fundamental interests include:
the right to vote, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968); the right to travel,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 393 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); the right of privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
The California Supreme Court has ruled that fundamental interests include: the
right of personal liberty, People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 55, 64 (1976); the right to education, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 604-10,
487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615-19 (1971); the right to hold public office,
Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 723, 484 P.2d 578, 582, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 606 (1971);
the right to an unanimous jury verdict in a criminal trial, People v. Superior Court,
67 Cal. 2d 929, 932, 434 P.2d 623, 625, 67 Cal. Rptr. 327, 329 (1967).
26. 15 Cal. 3d at 932, 544 P.2d at 1303, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
27. In applying the strict scrutiny test to the defendant's claim that liberty is a
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created by section 1272 was justified by a compelling state
interest. 8 The court articulated three possible state interests
which could compel the differentiation in statutory treatment
given convicted misdemeanants and convicted felons. First,
bail for a convicted misdemeanant is a matter of right because
of the usual brevity of a misdemeanor sentence. If bail was not
available to the misdemeanant, his sentence could conceivably
be served before a review of his appeal, thus denying him the
right to a meaningful appeal. 9 The same is not true for convicted felons. Second, a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor
is less likely to flee the jurisdiction because of the shortness of
a misdemeanor sentence as compared to a felony sentence.3
Finally, the legislature may have concluded that a convicted
misdemeanant poses less of a danger to the community and
and therefore it is not necessary to rely on the trial court's
3
discretion in determining post-conviction bail.
The court dealt more sympathetically with the defendant's final contention, that the trial court judge, by denying
bail, abused his discretion under section 1272. Noting that the
statutory language of section 1272 does not provide any interpretation of the "discretion" to be exercised by trial judges, the
court examined earlier cases construing discretion. In Ex parte
Hoge" discretion had been defined as "not . . .an arbitrary
discretion to do abstract justice according to the popular meaning of the phrase, but as a discretion governed by legal rules to
do justice according to the law." 33 Generally this was held to
mean that bail on appeal was limited to "extraordinary circumstances."'" In In re Brumback the discretion authorized by
section 1272 was defined as a "sound legal discretion to be
fundamental interest, the court was aware that it had a case pending dealing with the
issue of liberty as a fundamental interest. The court was undoubtedly influenced in
applying the strict scrutiny test by the decision it was to hand down six months later
in People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976), holding that
personal liberty is a fundamental interest protected by the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 251, 551 P.2d at 384, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
28. 15 Cal. 3d at 932, 544 P.2d at 1303, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
29. Id.
30. Id., 544 P.2d at 1303-04, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 103-04.
31. Id. at 932-33, 544 P.2d at 1304, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
32. 48 Cal. 3 (1874).
33. Id. at 5.
34. The "extraordinary circumstances" required for bail pending appeal usually
involved a defendant in poor health who made a reasonable showing through physician
affidavits that continued incarceration could result in a worsening of his condition so
as to endanger his life. See In re Pantages, 209 Cal. 535, 537-39, 291 P. 831, 832-33
(1930); In re Ward, 127 Cal. 489, 490-91, 59 P. 894, 894-95 (1900).
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governed in light of all attending circumstances.""5 The
Podesto court noted that since Brumback, the rule has been
clear that there is no presumption against release on appeal
and such release is not to be confined to "extraordinary circumstances.""
The court then discussed the specific criteria which should
be considered by a trial court in exercising its discretion under
section 1272. Again citing Brumback, it was observed that the
primary purpose of bail is to assure that the defendant is present in court when required. 7 The court set out three factors to
be used to determine the likelihood of a defendant's continued
presence in court: "(1) the defendant's ties to the community,
including his employment, duration of his residence, his family
attachments and his property holdings; (2) the defendant's record of appearance at past court hearings or of flight to avoid
prosecution; and (3) the severity of the sentence the defendant
faces." 3 If the defendant can demonstrate, using the above
criteria, that the likelihood of his flight is minimal, he has
made a prima facie case for his release pending appeal.39
One factor a court may consider to rebut a prima facie case
for release is the likelihood that the convicted defendant will
commit additional crime while released pending appeal and
thus become a danger to the community. 0 The Podesto court
cited In re Scaggs4' for this proposition, although the appeallant had argued that Scaggs was overruled by In re
Underwood.42 According to Podesto, Underwood had held that
bail, whether before or after conviction, was not subject to a
"danger to the community" limitation. The court dismissed
this contention, again stating that Underwood dealt only with
the right to pre-conviction bail.43 Noting the Underwood court's
concern with the difficulty of predicting future criminal conduct, the Podesto court determined that, although a court has
the authority to deny post-conviction bail to a defendant whose
history indicates a pattern of criminal conduct, this factor
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

46 Cal. 2d 810, 813, 299 P.2d 217, 219 (1956).
15 Cal. 3d at 934, 544 P.2d at 1304-05, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 104-05.
Id., 544 P.2d at 1305, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
Id. at 934-35, 544 P.2d at 1305, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
Id. at 935, 544 P.2d at 1305, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 105.

Id.
47 Cal. 2d 416, 303 P.2d 1009 (1956).
9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973).
15 Cal. 3d at 935, 544 P.2d at 1305, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
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should be used cautiously."
Finally, the court determined that bail may be denied to
a defendant if it appears that his appeal is frivolous or is not
being diligently prosecuted." On the other hand, a court may
not require an appeal to appear meritorious as a prerequisite
for the granting of bail.4" The denial of bail based on this factor
is justifiable when "'the appeal is so baseless as to deserve to
be condemned as "frivolous" or is sought as a device for mere
delay.' ,,17
While the trial court has primary discretion in applying
the above criteria to an application for bail pending appeal,
and a denial will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless
a "manifest abuse of discretion is shown", 48 the Podesto court
noted that the limited review allowed appellate courts is often
frustrated by the trial judge's lack of articulation of reasons
supporting the denial. 9 Thus, in its supervisory authority over
state criminal procedure the California Supreme Court held
that in the future trial courts must set out a brief statement of
the reasons for the denial of bail pending appeal.5" The articulation of reasons for such denial must be set forth " 'with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.'""

The dissent argued that judicial action as distinguished
from judicial motivation is the proper subject for appellate
review. 2 Relying on D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners"
for the proposition that a ruling which is proper on any theory
of law should be upheld on appeal, the dissent argued that the
reviewing court should concern itself solely with the action of
the court and whether this action had any proper legal basis;5"
the court should not require trial judges to articulate the
"right" reasons behind a decision.55 Additionally the dissent
pointed out that since the parties have the responsibility to
44.
45.
46.
47.
Justice,
48.
49.
50.
51.
420, 428
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 936, 544 P.2d at 1306, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
Id.
Id.
Id. quoting Ward v. United States, 76 S. Ct. 1063, 1065 (Frankfurter, Circuit
1956).
15 Cal. 3d at 937, 544 P.2d at 1306, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
Id., 544 P.2d at 1306-07, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07.
Id. at 938, 544 P.2d at 1307, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
Id. quoting People v. Browning, 54 Cal. App. 3d 125, 137-38, 119 Cal. Rptr.
(1975) and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
15 Cal. 3d at 938, 544 P.2d at 1308, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974).
15 Cal. 3d at 939, 544 P.2d at 1308, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
Id.
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present evidence at the motion for bail on appeal, there would
be no frustration of appellate review because the record will
reflect that evidence."
The dissent relied on the established principle that an
appellate court should review only the action of the lower court
and not its reasoning. 7 Requiring review of the reasons for a
denial of bail on appeal is an exception to this rule and the
dissent feared that this exception would become the rule of the
future. 8
Podesto marks a break with prior California law regarding
bail pending appeal, but the change is more one of form than
of substance. A trial court must now articulate the reasons for
a denial of bail on appeal, but the discretion to be exercised by
a court in ruling on the motion is essentially unchanged. The
Podesto court has consolidated in one opinion three previously
suggested nonexclusive criteria that a trial court may consider
in ruling on a motion for bail on appeal-the likelihood of a
defendant's flight, his potential danger to the community, and
the frivolousness or lack of diligent prosecution of his appeal.
A trial court prior to Podesto was expected to exercise its
discretion with the realization that bail is to ensure the presence of the defendant in court when required." In considering
the likelihood of flight, the court suggested that when an evaluation of the defendant's ties to the community, his record at
past court hearings and the sentence he faces are favorable to
the defendant, a prima facie case has been made for bail on
appeal. The fact that the decision encourages the court on its
own initiative to consider the additional factors of possible
harm to the community and the frivolousness of the appeal,
indicates that the court did not intend to shift the burden of
going forward with the evidence to the opposing party. The
court will examine those factors on its own, but the fact that a
prima facie case is said to be established on a showing that the
likelihood of flight is small is a clear indication that this factor
is seen as the critical one.
56. Id. at 940, 544 P.2d at 1309, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
57. See, e.g., People v. Sears, 18 Cal. 635, 636 (1861); People v. Evans, 249 Cal.
App. 2d 254, 262, 57 Cal. Rptr. 276, 281 (1967).
58. 15 Cal. 3d at 939, 544 P.2d at 1308, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
59. See McDermott v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 693, 695, 493 P.2d 1161, 1163,
100 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299 (1972); In re Newbern, 55 Cal. 2d 500, 504, 360 P.2d 43, 45, 11
Cal. Rptr. 547, 549 (1961); In re Brumback, 46 Cal. 2d 810, 813, 299 P.2d 217, 219
(1956).
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The Podesto decision does place a new burden on the California trial court judge to articulate reasons for the denial of
bail on appeal, but this burden will not curb a judge's discretion to any substantial degree. The language of the decision
does not require strict adherence to the court's suggested criteria in ruling on the motion. Nowhere in the decision are these
criteria couched in mandatory terms; rather, they are intended
as guidelines to be used in the exercise and articulation of the
trial court's discretionary power.' To prevent a finding of a
"manifest abuse of discretion" resulting in a reversal of the
denial of bail, a trial judge must articulate reasons which, in
light of all the surrounding circumstances, make a denial proper and reasonable. Such limited review by an appellate court
virtually prevents a reversal of a denial of bail on appeal if the
trial court makes a reasonable showing as to the likelihood of
the defendant's flight, his danger to the community, or the
frivolousness or lack of diligent prosecution of his appeal. Thus,
the discretion vested in trial courts is not substantially changed
by Podesto; rather, it has been given direction and definition.
Thomas K. Brown
60. In exercising discretion on a motion for bail pending appeal, "courts may
consider" the defendant's likelihood of flight, his potential danger to the community,
the frivolousness of his appeal. 15 Cal. 3d at 932, 544 P.2d at 1304, 127 Cal. Rptr. at
104 (emphasis added).
"[Tihe likelihood of flight is not the only factor that a court may consider.
Id. at 935, 544 P.2d at 1305, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 105 (emphasis added).
"[A] court may ... decline to grant such release if it determines that the appeal
is wholly frivolous or [is not being diligently prosecuted]." Id. at 936, 544 P.2d at 1306,
127 Cal. Rptr. at 107 (emphasis added).

PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY-JUDICIAL DISCRETION
DETERMINES WHETHER PERSONAL INJURY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL MAY ATTEND PRE-TRIAL PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION
2032-Edwards v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 905, 549 P.2d 846,
130 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
In a personal injury action filed against the Santa Clara
County Unified School District,' Ms. Cathryn Edwards alleged
that due to the negligence of the school district in failing to
provide proper instruction and supervision she had sustained
injury in May, 1971, while using a school trampoline.2 She
sought to recover general and special damages for her physical
and emotional injuries.
In addition to its answer to plaintiff's complaint, defendant school district moved, pursuant to California Code of
Civil Procedure section 20321, for an order requiring plaintiff to
submit to a four hour psychiatric examination to be conducted
by Dr. Mervyn Shoor.4 Plaintiff did not object to the psychiatric examination itself, however, she did ask the trial court to
rule that her counsel be present during the examination, that
someone other than Dr. Shoor conduct the examination, and
that the length of the examination be reduced.' The trial court
rejected each of plaintiff's requests.
Denied a hearing at the court of appeal, plaintiff brought
this action before California Supreme Court seeking a writ of
1. Edwards v. Santa Clara County Unified School Dist., No. 265-100 (Santa
Clara County Super. Ct., filed Nov. 29, 1971).
2. Edwards v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 905, 549 P.2d 846, 847, 130 Cal. Rptr.
14, 15 (1976). After the accident Ms. Edwards' left arm was paralyzed, and a cervical
vertebrae was fractured. She was unable to pursue a "promising"musical career and
became severely depressed, making several attempts to commit suicide. Petition for
Extraordinary Relief with Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 8,
Edwards v. Santa Clara County Unified School Dist., No. 265-100 (Santa Clara
County Super. Ct., filed Nov. 29, 1971).
3.

CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2032 (West Supp. 1976) provides in pertinent part:
In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party . . .is

in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the
party-to submit to a physical or mental . . . examination . .

.

.The

order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice
to the person to be examined and to all. parties and shall specify the
time, place, manner, conditions and scope of the examination and the
person or persons by whom it is to be made.
4. 16 Cal. 3d at 905, 549 P.2d at 847, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
5. Id. at 908, 549 P.2d at 847-48, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 15-16.
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mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate its order contending that the trial court had abused its discretion. The California Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs contentions and held
that under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032 a plaintiff has
no right to presence of counsel at a pre-trial psychiatric
examination and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion' either in excluding counsel, in requiring plaintiff to be
examined by Dr. Shoor or in granting the four-hour examination period.'
The court distinguished prior cases8 depending upon
whether the examination was physical or psychiatric,' and
upon whether it was to be conducted pursuant to section 187111
or section 2032" of the Code of Civil Procedure.'"
6. The test for abuse of discretion in California is whether the court, in the
exercise of its discretionary power, has exceeded "the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances before it being considered." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 47 Cal. 2d 428, 432, 304 P.2d 13, 15 (1956); Morgan v. County of San Diego, 19
Cal. App. 3d 636, 640-41, 97 Cal. Rptr. 180, 182 (1971).
Only when a trial court has abused its discretionary power may the court's exercise
of such power be overturned. See Clavery v. Ford, 87 Cal. 413, 419, 25 P. 493, 495
(1891). The trial court's decision will not be overturned simply because the court of
appeal might have made a different judgment. The appellant bears the burden of proof
to show that the trial court abused its discretion. McCreadie v. Arques, 248 Cal. App.
2d 39, 45, 56 Cal. Rptr. 188, 192 (1967). See generally 4 CAL. JuR. 2D Appeal and Error
§ 592-93 (1952).
7. 16 Cal. at 906-08, 549 P.2d at 846-48, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 14-16.
8. Gonzi v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 586, 335 P.2d 97 (1959); Sharff v. Superior
Court, 44 Cal. 2d 508, 282 P.2d 896 (1955); Whitfield v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. App.
2d 81, 54 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1966); Durst v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 2d 447, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 143 (1963).
9. Few courts have dealt decisively with the problem of the presence of third
parties at psychiatric examinations. See, e.g., Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269
(D.C. Cir. 1964); In re Spencer, 63 Cal. 2d 400, 406 P.2d 33, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1965);
Kelley v. Smith & Oby Co., 70 Ohio L. Abs. 202, 129 N.E.2d 106 (1954); Nomina v.
Eggeman, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 122, 900 Ohio L. Abs. 57, 188 N.E.2d 440 (1962); Tietjen v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 13 Wash. App. 86, 534 P.2d 151 (1975). Both Nomina
and Tietjen relied on Sharff (see note 14 infra) in allowing presence of counsel.
10. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1871 (West 1967) provided in part:
Whenever it shall be made to appear to any court or judge thereof, either
before or during the trial of any action or proceeding, civil, criminal, or
juvenile court, pending before such court, that expert evidence is, or will
be required by the court or any party to such action or proceeding, such
court or judge may, on motion of any party, or on motion of such court
or judge, appoint one or more experts to investigate and testify at the trial
of such action or proceeding relative to the matter or matters as to which
such expert evidence is, or will be required ....
The pertinent part of this section has been superceded by CAL. EvM. CODE § 730 (West
1968). This change occurred after the Durst decision (see note 17 infra) and had no
impact on the issue presented.
11. See note 3 supra.
12. One commentator has noted that judicial permission for counsel's presence
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The court first addressed itself to Sharff v. SuperiorCourt,
a personal injury action in which the court held that plaintiff
had a right to presence of counsel during a physical examination conducted by defendant's doctor. 3 The Sharff court reasoned that:
Whenever a doctor selected by the defendant conducts a
physical examination of the plaintiff, there is a possibility
that improper questions may be asked, and a lay person
should not be expected to evaluate the propriety of every
question at his peril. The plaintiff, therefore, should be
permitted to have the assistance and protection of an attorney during the examination."
The plaintiff in Edwards contended that the protection
afforded the plaintiff/examinee in Sharff was equally applicable to a psychiatric examination since the proceeding in
during a pre-trial physical examination generally depends on whether the examination
is seen as part of an adversary proceeding. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2236 (1970). Compare Williams v. Chattanooga Iron Works, 5 Tenn.
C.C.A. 10, aff'd, 131 Tenn. 683, 176 S.W. 1031, (1915) with Bowing v. Delaware Rayon
Co., 38 Del. 206, 190 A. 567 (1937). The court in Williams stated:
As this power is to be exerted upon rare occasions and under extraordinary circumstances, we prescribe as one of the conditions the right of the
plaintiff to have his counsel and his physician present during the examination. We are inclined to the view that this power to compel physical
examination in secret and without the presence of counsel would be so
inconsistent with the inalienable rights of the individual and so abhorrent
to the universal sense of protective instinct as that it would have to be
denied. Hence, our reason for laying down the proposition that plaintiff
must be given the right to take with him to the examining room his own
counsel and his own physician. He must not be subjected to secret examinations of experts who might be influenced to deny him justice.
5 Tenn. C.C.A. at 20 (emphasis added).
Though a matter tr judicial discretion, counsel's presence is generally allowed
only upon motion showing good cause. State ex rel. Lambdin v. Brenton, 21 Ohio St.
2d 21, 51 Ohio Op. 2d 44, 254 N.E.2d 681 (1970); 23 AM. JUR. 2D §§ 210, 222 (1965); 8
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2236 (1970).
13. 44 Cal. 2d 508, 511, 282 P.2d 896, 897 (1955). Sharff relied on Johnson v.
Southern Pac. Co., 150 Cal. 535, 89 P. 348, (1907), for the proposition that a plaintiff
in a personal injury action may be required to submit to a physical examination
conducted by the defendant's doctor. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2032 (West Supp. 1976)
now codifies the proposition that plaintiff may be ordered by the court to undergo a
pre-trial physical or mental examination.
14. 44 Cal. 2d at 510, 282 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added), noted with approval in
Edwards v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 905, 909, 549 P.2d 846, 848, 130 Cal. Rptr. 14,
16 (1976). Sharff relied on a long standing principle enunciated in Williams v. Chattanooga Iron Works, 5 Tenn. C.C.A. 10, aff'd 131 Tenn. 683, 176 S.W. 1031 (1915). See
note 12 and accompanying text supra.
A writ of mandamus was issued requiring respondent court to allow the case to
proceed to trial without forcing plaintiff to be examined in her attorney's absence.
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Edwards was similarly adversary in nature. The Edwards
court, however, did not adopt that view.
The plaintiff in Edwards additionally relied on Gonzi v.
Superior Court in which the court extended the "rights" of
plaintiffs in personal injury actions by allowing the presence of
a reporter during a pre-trial physical examination conducted
by defendant's doctor.'5 The Gonzi court considered such an
examination to be an adversary proceeding, and reasoned that
without a reporter present during such an examination none of
the parties would be able to present a "disinterested" report of
what transpired."
Both Sharff and Gonzi involved pre-trial physical examinations conducted at the request of defendants to personal injury actions. In Durst v. Superior Court 7 two variations on the
Sharff/Gonzi theme was introduced. Durst involved a psychiatric examination to be conducted on the court's own motion,
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1871.
The plaintiff in Durst had sought to recover from an insurance company for his total disability allegedly caused by an
automobile accident resulting in a psychosis. Neither party
being able to persuade the court on plaintiff's true mental condition, the court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
1871,'1 appointed its own "disinterested expert"' 9 to conduct a
psychiatric examination.° The court, distinguishing SharfJ and
15. 51 Cal. 2d 586, 335 P.2d 97 (1959). Gonzi was the first in this line of cases
decided pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032 which became effective on
January 1, 1958; Sharff was decided in 1955.
It is significant to note that comparable actions in federal courts are governed by
FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a) which, in language almost identical to that of section 2032,
provides that
In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in
controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order him to
submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician. The order
may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to
the party to be examined and to all other parties and shall specify the
time, place, manner, conditions and scope of the examination and the
person or persons by whom it is to be made.
16. 51 Cal. 2d at 589, 335 P.2d at 99. See Munoz v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App.
3d 643, 102 Cal. Rptr. 686, (1972) in which the court held that a reporter could not be
deemed a substitute for an attorney during a physical examination.
17. 222 Cal. App. 2d 447, 35 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1-963).
18. See note 10 supra.
19. The court appointed Dr. Norman Brill, then Chairman of the Department
of Psychiatry at the U.C.L.A. Medical School, a nationally known neurologist, psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. See note 23 infra.
20. 222 Cal. App. 2d at 448-49, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 144. Plaintiff had been examined
by 21 doctors who had been unable to agree whether he was psychotic as a result of
the accident or malingering. Id. at 449, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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Gonzi on the basis that its examination was psychiatric rather
than physical"' and made under section 1871 rather than section 2032 of the Code of Civil Procedure," held that plaintiff's

counsel could be excluded."
Whitfield v. Superior Court24 presented the identical issue
as Edwards. Both the majority and minority found it indistinguishable. In Whitfield the defendant, pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 2032, asked the court to compel plaintiff to undergo a psychiatric examination to be conducted by
defendant's physician." The court in Whitfield distinguished
Sharff and Gonzi2 ' and gave particular attention to the Durst
court's discussion of the differences between section 1871 (impartial court-ordered examination) and section 2032 (adversary
proceedings)27 and the fact that the examination was psychiatric and not physical."' The Whitfield court chose the latter
distinction as "more persuasive" and was perceptibly swayed
21. The court reasoned:
[an] important distinguishing factor is that the examination here in
question is more properly classified as psychiatric, as opposed to a purely
physical examination. In both Gonzi and Sharff the court was discussing
a physical examination and there were no compelling reasons why persons should be excluded from the examination. In contrast, the instant
case involes a psychiatric examination whose subjective nature requires
an atmosphere that is conducive to freedom of expression on the part of
the examinee.
222 Cal. App. 2d at 452-53, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47 (footnotes omitted).
22. The court stated:
The difference between Section 1871 and Section 2032 of the Code of Civil
Procedure should be kept clearly in mind. Under Section 2032 one of the
parties may request the court to order a person to submit to examination.
This examination may be conducted by the physician for the party requesting the examination; and in a sense might be considered an adversary proceeding. In contrast, under Section 1871 the examination is made
on the court's own motion and it may appoint an independent and disinterested expert who serves the purpose of providing the court with an
impartial report.
Id. at 451, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46. See notes 3 and 10 supra.
23. Id. at 452, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 146. The court may have been influenced in its
decision by Dr. Brill's prominence, although the court's distinction is explicitly based
on the differences between sections 1871 and 2032 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See
note 53 and accompanying text infra.
24. 246 Cal. App. 2d 81, 54 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1966).
25. Id. at 82, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 506. Relying on Durst, the respondent court denied
plaintiff's request that her counsel be present; plaintiff appealed the order, contending
that the trial court has abused its discretion.
26. The Whitfield court noted that the Sharff and Gonzi decisions were limited
to physical examinations. 246 Cal. App. 2d at 85, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
27. Id. at 83, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 506. See note 22 supra.
28. See note 21 supra.
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by the Durst court's psychiatrist's statement describing the
necessity of conducting the examination without the presence
of third parties. 9 In apparent response to the former distinction, Whitfield suggested that the nature of the examinations
purusant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1871 and 2032
were similar, stating: "[Dlefendants here expect the doctor
selected by them to make a psychiatric examination which is
at least unbiased and objective in order that his testimony, if
offered, will convince the jury of petitioner's actual mental

condition. "3
In this context Edwards held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion, and rejected plaintiff's argument that the
decisions in Sharff and Gonzi were determinative when the
examination was to be psychiatric. 3 ' The court instead relied
on the decisions in Whitfield and Durst, and concluded that
the nature of the examination required the absence of third
parties."2
The Edwards court found additional authority in In re
Spencer33 to support its conclusion that the examinee's rights
concomitant to psychiatric examinations were unique and not
controlled by the decisions in Sharff and Gonzi. Although
Spencer was a criminal proceeding, 4 the Edwards court found
29. 246 Cal. App. 2d at 85-86, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
30. Id. at 86, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
31. 16 Cal. 3d at 909, 549 P.2d at 848, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
32. Id. at 909-10, 549 P.2d at 848-49, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17.
The Edwards court was apparently not persuaded by the Durst court's implicit
reasoning that though the plaintiff needed no protection from an impartial courtappointed expert, if the proceeding were adversary in nature, the plaintiff's need for
protection of counsel would be more determinative than the question of undisturbed
rapport between examiner and examinee. Durst v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 2d
at 452, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 146.

33. 63 Cal. 2d 400, 406 P.2d 33, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1965).
34. In Spencer the court held, inter alia, that a criminal defendant had no right
to counsel (automatic sixth amendment privilege) during a psychiatric examination
conducted by a court-appointed psychiatrist as long as three conditions were met. The
court stated:
Before submitting to an examination by court-appointed psychiatrists a defendant must be represented by counsel or intelligently and
knowingly have waived that right. Defendant's counsel must be informed
as to the appointment of such psychiatrists. If, after submitting to an
examination, a defendant does not specifically place his mental condition
into issue at the guilt trial, then the court-appointed psychiatrist should
not be permitted to testify at the guilt trial. If defendant does specifically
place his mental condition into issue at the guilt trial, then the courtappointed psychiatrist should be permitted to testify at the guilt trial,
but the court should instruct the jurors that the psychiatrist's testimony
as to defendant's incriminating statements should not be regarded as
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an analogue in the requirements for an effective psychiatric
examination and referred to Judge David Bazelon's language
in Rolleson v. United States, to which the Spencer court also
referred: "The basic tool of psychiatric study remains the
personal interview, which requires rapport between the interviewer and the subject."3"
Since presence of counsel would hinder the establishment
of the required rapport, the Edwards court, citing Spencer with
approval, reasoned that such a presence would largely negate
the value of the examination. 8
Edwards also rejected plaintiff's argument that her attorney's presence was required to protect her against improper
questions by the examiner. The court observed that the attorney lacked the skill and training "to define the psychiatric
relevance of elicited answers" and pointed to the difference
between "legally objectionable" questions and those which
"might [have been] very relevant in the formulation
of a
sound psychiatric judgment."3 7
The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that her attorney's presence was required for her support, observing that
family members, a religious advisor or the plaintiff/examinee's
own therapist might be necessary to provide such support-a
result the court was unable to tolerate. 38
The court then countered plaintiff's contention that her
counsel's presence was needed to insure accurate reporting of
the interview, by stressing the availability of procedural safeguards-counsel's access to the examiner's records, deposition
of the examiner, voir dire and cross examination of the examiner at trial with the help of the plaintiff's own psychiatric
expert. The court suggested that these safeguards were not only
acceptable but preferred alternatives.3
proof of the truth of the facts disclosed by such statements and that such
evidence may be considered only for the limited purpose of showing the
information upon which the psychiatrist based his opinion.
Id. at 412, 406 P.2d at 41, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (footnotes omitted).
35. 343 F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
36. 16 Cal. 3d at 910, 549 P.2d at 849, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
37. Id. at 911, 549 P.2d at 849, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
38. Id. at 911, 549 P.2d at 850, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 18. The court did mention the
need for safeguarding the physical or mental condition of the plaintiff, but asserted
that the validity of the examination was paramount. Id.
39. Id. at 912, 549 P.2d at 850, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
40. Dr. Parker, Ms. Edwards' therapist, stated:
As a result of the trauma to which Cathryn has been subjected in the
last several years, she is very sensitive to her environment. That she has
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The court next disposed of plaintiff's contention that the
trial court abused its discretion by requiring plaintiff to be
examined by Dr. Shoor, by referring to the implicit recognition
generally given by courts of the defendant's right to select the
physician in an examination to be conducted under Code of
Civil Procedure section 2032. The court noted that the plaintiff
0
did not challenge the psychiatrist's professional competence
and that as a matter of law the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying plaintiff's request.4
The dissent offered a persuasive argument that a Code of
Civil Procedure section 2032 pre-trial psychiatric examination
is indeed adversary in nature and that the plaintiff should not
be required to submit to such an examination without the presence of her counsel." Justice Sullivan, for the minority, rejected the majority's distinction between physical and psychiatric examinations, and asserted that the concerns expressed
in the Sharff-Gonzi decisions were even more appropriate with
regard to psychiatric examinations. They observed that "the
entire substance" of a psychiatric examination was "an interview between patient and doctor," and concluded that an examinee in a psychiatric examination was more vulnerable than
an examinee in a physical examination to the dangers sought
met Dr. Shoor on one occasion, and has expressed extreme anixiety concerning any further contact with him. That because of her extreme vulnerability, it is unimportant as to whether or not these actions are justified; it is only important, for her well being, that she not be interjected
into a situation where feelings of this nature would be engendered.
Declaration of Thomas E. Parker, Ph.D., in Opposition to Motion for Psychiatric
Examination at 2, Edwards v. Santa Clara County Unified School Dist., No. 265-100
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct., filed Nov. 29, 1971).
41. 16 Cal. 3d at 913, 549 P.2d at 851, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 19. Most authorities
suggest that the choice of the physician should be left to the examining party. See
Annot., 33 A.L.R. 3d § 4(C), at 1012 (1970) (although primarily discussing physical
examinations, the reasoning appears to be applicable to psychiatric examinations). Cf.
Martin v. Superior Court, 104 Ariz. 268, 271, 451 P.2d 597, 600 (1969); 8 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2234 (1970) (where the authors conclude that a defendant does not have an absolute right to name the doctor to conduct
a physical or mental examination of plaintiff, but rather it is within the discretion of
the trial court to determine whether plaintiff has good cause to object to defendant's
choice). There is additional authority to suggest that defendant's choice of a physician
will not be supported by the court if the plaintiff files a strong objection. See Gitto v.
Societa Anonima Di Navigazione, Genova, 27 F. Supp. 785 (D.C.N.Y. 1939); Carnine
v. Tibbets, 158 Or. 21, 74 P.2d 974 (1937). See also Jackson v. Cocca, 27 App. Div. 2d
700, 276 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1967) (trial court's designation of the defendant's physician
after the plaintiff objected to that physician was an "improvident exercise of discretion").
42. 16 Cal. 3d at 914-19, 549 P.2d at 851-55, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 19-22 (Sullivan,
J., dissenting).
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to be avoided in Sharf. 43
The minority strongly contended that the nature of a Code
of Civil Procedure section 2032 psychiatric examination is
adversary, and that because the examinee is required to submit
to an examination by a "representative" of the adversary, the
"special and private rapport between examiner and examinee"
could not exist. Viewing the examination as such, the minority
rejected the conclusion that the attorney's presence would endanger the essence of the examination, and accepted the plaintiff's contention that presence of counsel would provide not
only comfort and support, but protection against improper
44
questions.

The minority further disagreed with the majority's reliance on In re Spencer 41 and distinguished Spencer on the
grounds that it was a criminal proceeding, and that the examination there was ordered by the court and conducted by a
court-appointed psychiatrist.

41

Identifying Durst and Whitfield as either "distinguishable
. . . or not persuasive" the minority emphasized that nothing

should interfere with protection of the examinee and that "the
protection offered by the attorney's presence outweighs any
potential infringement upon the effectiveness of the examination."47
The right of a plaintiff/examinee to have counsel present
during a psychiatric examination is indeed significant, but in
Edwards the California Supreme Court seemed more concerned with preserving the "special requirements" of a psychi43. Id. at 915, 549 P.2d at 852, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 20. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
44. 16 Cal. 3d at 915, 549 P.2d at 852, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
45. The minority stated: "I think it clear that Spencer, which is based upon

constitutional considerations not here applicable, is of doubtful relevance to the case
at bench, wherein the sole issue is one of sound judicial policy in civil proceedings."
Id. at 918, 549 P.2d at 854, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
46. In Spencer the examination was ordered pursuant to section 1027 of the Penal
Code which provides, in pertinent part:
When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity the court must
select and appoint two, and may select and appoint three, psychiatrists

to examine the defendant and investigate his sanity. It is the duty of the
psychiatrists so selected and appointed to examine the defendant and
investigate his insanity, and to testify, whenever summoned, in any proceeding in which the sanity of the defendant is in question.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1027 (West 1970).
47. 16 Cal. 3d at 915-17, 549 P.2d at 852-53, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21. The minority
further asserts that the importance of protection for the plaintiff outweighs any risks
of counsel's interference, in fact should be the "paramount" consideration.
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atric examination than affording a plaintiff protection of counsel. One crucial factor in the court's decision was apparently
the refusal of the psychiatrist to conduct an evaluation interview with counsel present. Such an absolute refusal by this
psychiatrist, however, is not condoned by all, as there exists
good authority which stands against automatically precluding
counsel's presence. Some suggest that "[tihe examination for
psychic injury should be conducted in the following manner:
the complainant ought to be examined by the psychiatrist
either alone or in the company of his attorney if requested." 8
Recent commentators suggest that the legal profession
should be sensitive to the inexact nature of psychiatry and
question the wisdom of assuming that psychiatric judgments
are reliable and valid.4" Whether such reliability and validity
exists at all is an especially pertinent question to Edwards
48. 12 M. LzwIs & R. SADOFF, COURT ROOM MEDICINE § 7.00 The Examining
Psychiatrist and the PsychiatricExamination (1975). See Tietjen v. Department of
Labor and Indus., 13 Wash. App. 86, 534 P.2d 151 (1975) (workmen's compensation
case where plaintiff motioned the court to allow his counsel to be present after defendant requested psychiatric examination under CR 35, equivalent to Code of Civil Procedure section 2032). The Tietjen court, quoting from Sharff on the potential for improper questions during a physical examination, stated:
We see no reason why a different rule should be applied where a psychiatric examination is ordered. A CR 35 medical and mental examination
[sic] is a legal proceeding, at which the plaintiff is entitled to representation. A physician-patient relationship establishing privilege does not
exist where the plaintiff in a personal injury action is examined by a
physician at the request of the defendant. There may be questions which
the plaintiff may refuse to answer, especially those possibly prohibited
by the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. An attorney insures that the procedure, tests and results are reported accurately,
and that the examination does not become the taking of deposition as to
the facts in issue. Any unnecessary interference caused by an attorney
could be alleviated by specific court order.
534 P.2d at 154 (footnotes omitted.) See note 14 and accompanying text
Id. at -,
supra.
49. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumptionof Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV., 693 (1974). The authors state:
This assumption of expertise rests upon two further assumptions; that
psychiatrists are able to reach conclusions that are reliable, that is that
other psychiatrists would agree with those conclusions; and that those
conclusions are valid, that is, that they accurately reflect reality. Unfortunately, judges and legislators are not aware of the enormous and
relatively consistent body of professional literature questioning the reliability and validity of psychiatric evaluations and predictions. So far as
we are aware, the relevant professional literature has never been collected
and analyzed in a legal periodical.
Id. at 695 (emphasis in original). See generally Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist
as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335,
1344 (1965).
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since Dr. Shoor and the psychiatrist involved in Durst are in
essence pleading that their examinations can be reliable and
valid only if unattended by counsel, and that their examinations will be reliable and valid if their standards are met.
The other side of the coin is the approach taken by courts
who are ready to accept the testimony of an expert medical
witness as impartial and objective.50 The Edwards minority
discounts this "wishful approach" by noting that "numerous
courts and commentators have criticized the willingness of
many experts to become the hired champions of one side or the
other . . . . ",' The Edwards minority is not alone in viewing
the impartiality of expert witnesses as a fallacious contention;
two notable authors have expressed similar concerns, and have
opined:
The law too much assumes that psychiatric experts,
especially court-appointed ones but to a degree also those
called by the parties, are impartial; that they furnish
neutral expertise rather than professional viewpoint. The
reality of this is open to question.
Should the law then permit the illusion that the psychiatrist remains impartial and outside the adversary sys52
tem? We think not.

On balance it seems that the plaintiff's need for protection53 during an examination recognized to be adversary in nature, should be accorded more weight than the requirements of
the experts. 4 However, in Edwards the parameters established
50. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Superior Court, 246 Cal. App. 2d 81, 86, 54 Cal. Rptr.
505, 508 (1966); accord, Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26 F.R.D. 595 (1960).
51. 16 Cal. 3d at 919 n.6, 549 P.2d at 855 n.6, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 23 n.6 (1976)
(emphasis added).
52. Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatristas an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MIcH. L. REV. 1335, 1344 (1965).

53. Although Sharff, Gonzi and Durst emphasized the importance of protecting
the plaintiff during adversary proceedings, there is no judicial or statutory analogue
in civil proceedings to the sixth amendment right to counsel. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
54. The importance for presence of counsel at an adversary proceeding is perhaps
best exemplified by the following statement:
[The adversary] system proceeds on the assumption that the best way
to ascertain the truth is to present to an impartial judge or jury a confronation between the proponents of conflicting views, assigning to each the
task of marshalling and presenting the evidence in as thorough and persuasive a way as possible. The truth-seeking techniques used by the advocates on each side include investigation, pretrial discovery, crossexamination of opposing witnesses, and a marshalling of the evidence in
summation. Thus, the judge or jury is given the strongest possible view
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by the psychiatric examiner have apparently prevailed over the
plaintiff/examinee's need for protection.
Beth Little Arnold
of each side, and is put in the best possible position to make an accurate
and fair judgment. Nevertheless, the point that I now emphasize is that
in a society that honors the dignity of the individual, the high value that
we assign to truth-seeking is not an absolute, but may on occasion be
subordinated to even higher values.
M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4 (1975).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OBSCENITY-CALIFORNIA
PENAL CODE SECTION 311 DEFINING OBSCENE MATTER IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE-Bloom v.
Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 545 P.2d 229, 127 Cal. Rptr.
317 (1976).
In January, 1972, a criminal complaint alleging a violation
of California Penal Code section 311.2(a)' was filed in Inglewood Municipal Court against Noel Bloom, who was connected
with a California corporation which sold an 8 mm film
through the mail. A deputy in the Los Angeles Sheriff's Vice
Bureau, Pornography Division, purchased the film using a detachable order form included in a color brochure anonymously
sent to the Sheriff's Department.
Bloom filed a petition in superior court for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Inglewood Municipal Court from proceeding on the complaint. The superior court denied the writ and
Bloom appealed to the court of appeal. The court of appeal
treated the appeal as a petition for an original writ of prohibition and, after considering the merits, denied the writ.2 The
California Supreme Court granted a hearing and affirmed.'
During the four years which elapsed between the filing of
the complaint and the hearing by the California Supreme
1.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a) (West 1970) provides:
Every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or
causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state
possesses, prepares, publishes, or prints, with intent to distribute or to
exhibit to others, or who offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits to
others, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.
2. Bloom v. Municipal Court, 36 Cal. App. 3d 117, 111 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1974). The
court of appeal first ruled that a denial of a writ of prohibition by a superior court was
not appealable under the 1966 revision of article VI, 4(b), of the California Constitution, which defines appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeal. 111 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
By analogy to habeas corpus procedure, which allows a denial of the writ to be challenged by filing a new petition in a higher court, the court then held that the proper
remedy was a petition for an original writ of prohibition. Id. at 260.
3. Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 75, 545 P.2d 229, 231, 127 Cal. Rptr.
317, 325 (1976). The Bloom court held that although article VI of the California Constitution no longer expressly stated that courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction from
prohibition hearings in superior courts, the comments of the Constitution Revision
Commission and the Judicial Council did not indicate that the revision would affect
the appellate jurisdiction in appeals of writs of prohibition from superior courts. Thus,
denial of the writ was appealable. Bloom rejected the analogy to habeas corpus procedure which requires filing a new petition in a higher court after a denial of a writ of
habeas corpus. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1506 (West 1970). On the other hand, the statutes
which pertain to appeals apply also to writs of prohibition. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1110
(West 1955).
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Court, the constitutional standard of obscenity had been restated by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v.
California.I In an effort to provide basic guidelines for the trier
of fact in obscenity cases, the Court in Miller formulated a
three-pronged test:
(a) whether "the average person applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.'
The first issue presented in Bloom is whether section 311
is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specifically define what sexual conduct will be prohibited as required by part
(b) of the Miller test. The California statutory definition of
obscenity is stated in Penal Code section 311(a):
(a) "Obscene matter" means matter, taken as a whole, the
predominant appeal of which to the average person, applying contemporary standards, is to prurient interest, i.e., a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion;
and is matter which taken as a whole goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters; and is matter which taken as a
6
whole is utterly without redeeming social importance.
The Court in Miller recognized that material to be proscribed as obscene must be specifically defined by the applicable state law "as written or authoritatively construed." 7 Since
section 311 as written does not specifically define obscenity, the
California Supreme Court in Bloom sought to construe its
meaning by looking to two sources.
First, the court considered the "plain examples" given in
Miller as to what a state could proscribe under part (b) of the
Miller test. Miller confined the "permissible scope" of regula4.

413 U.S. 15 (1973).

5. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). For an analysis of the Millerstandard, see Hardy,
Miller v. California and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton: The Obscenity Doctrine
Reformulated, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTs L. REV. 219 (1974); Hunsaker, The 1973
Obscenity-PornographyDecisions: Analysis, Impact, and Legislative Alternatives, 11
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 906 (1974).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311(a) (West 1970).
7.

413 U.S. at 24.
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tion to depiction or description of sexual conduct' and gave as
examples:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of
the genitals.'
Although the Court in Miller emphasized that the examples
were not proposed as a "regulatory scheme" for the states and
that obscenity regulation was a legislative task, 0 the examples
have been used by courts to construe-sometimes upholding
and sometimes rejecting'-existing obscenity statutes which
had been challenged as unconstitutionally vague. The Bloom
court noted that the United States Supreme Court used the
Miller examples to construe federal statutes in United States
v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film" and in Hamling v. United States."
The Court in Hamling stated that Miller was not intended to
"cast doubt" on all obscenity statutes but that existing
statutes "as construed heretofore or hereafter, may well be adequate.""
8. Id.
9. Id. at 25.
10. Id.
11. Authorities have split in their interpretation of Miller as to the power of
courts to construe existing obscenity statutes. Three lines of cases have developed.
Relying upon footnote 6 of Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, which said that "existing state
statutes, as construed heretofore or hereafter, may well be adequate," some courts have
taken Miller as a mandate to construe statutes on the basis of prior decisions. See
People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1973); State v. J-R Distrib.,
Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973).
Other courts have construed existing statutes by adopting the Miller examples.
See Rhodes v. Florida, 283 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1973); State v. Harding, 114 N.H. 335, 320
A.2d 646 (1974); Redlich v. Capri Cinema, Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 27, 349 N.Y.S.2d 697
(1973); State ex rel. Keating v. "Vixen", 35 Ohio St. 2d 215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973).
However, the courts in some states have been unwilling to interpret Miller as
giving broad power to construe statutes and have found them unconstitutional under
the Miller standard. See Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. Cryan, 365 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J.
1973); Stroud v. State, 261 Ind. 58, 300 N.E.2d 100 (1973); State v. Wedelstedt,
Iowa , 213 N.W.2d 652 (1973); State v. Shreveport News Agency, Inc., - La.
, 287 So. 2d 464 (1973); Commonwealth v. Horton, Mass. , 310 N.E.2d
316 (1974).
For an example of an obscenity statute held to be unconstitutionally vague by the
United States Supreme Court, see Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972), a preMiller decision.
12. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
13. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
14. Id. at 112-13 (emphasis added).
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The second source the Bloom court considered was the
construction given section 311 by courts in prior decisions.
Three cases since Miller have ruled directly on the constitutionality of section 311. In 1973, the court of appeal in People
v. Enskat 5 held that section 311, as authoritatively construed,
satisfied the Miller requirement of specificity. The Enskat
court pointed out that previous cases"5 had limited section 311
to prohibiting only "hard core" pornography and graphic descriptions of sexual activity and that "Miller thus has not imposed any new requirements upon California law .... ""
Enskat was cited subsequently by the Orange County Superior
Court which heard Miller on remand and reaffirmed the conviction for distributing obscene material. The United States
Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from that hearing on remand in Miller v. CaliforniaII (Miller II) "for want of a substantial federal question."'"
The third decision construing section 311 was by a threejudge federal district court in Miranda v. Hicks, " which disagreed with the Enskat court as to the interpretation given the
obscenity statute by California courts. The Miranda court held
that it was not bound by Miller 11 and ruled that section 311
was unconstitutional because it failed to meet the Miller spe15. 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 937
(1974).
16. Enskat reviewed four California cases involving section 311. In People v.
Noroff, 67 Cal. 2d 791, 433 P.2d 479, 63 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1967), a magazine issue dealing
with nudity was held not obscene. The court stated that "no matter how ugly or
repulsive the presentation, we are not to hold nudity, absent a sexual activity, to be
obscene." Id. at 797, 433 P.2d at 483, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 579. In Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59
Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963), in which Tropic of Cancer by Henry
Miller was held not to be obscene, the court said that section 311 "constitutionally may
exorcise only hard-core pornography, and . . . the statute does no more." Id. at 904,
383 P.2d at 154, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 802. In People v. Cimber, 271 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
867, 76 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1969), the court stated that to be obscene "the material must
contain a graphic description of sexual activity." Id. at 869, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 383. In
Landau v. Fording, 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177, aff'd per curar, 388 U.S.
456 (1966), rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967), a silent film "Un Chant d'Amour,"
was held obscene under section 311. The court stated that the film-depicting various
forms of masturbation, homosexuality, and sadism in a prison setting-went "far
beyond customary limits of candor in offensively depicting certain unorthodox sexual
practices and relationships." Id. at 826, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
17. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 908-10, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39.

18.

418 U.S. 915 (1974).

19. 388 F. Supp. 350 (1974). In Miranda, the plaintiffs sought the release of four
copies of the film, Deep Throat, which had been seized by the Buena Park police and
held by the municipal court. Relief was sought in the federal courts under a due process
challenge to section 311 contending that no person may be subject to criminal prosecution without fair warning of the conduct which is prohibited.

240
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cificity requirement.2' The Supreme Court in Hicks v.
Miranda ' reversed that holding and pointed out that the lower
court could not disregard the fact that the appeal in Miller II
was dismissed. The Bloom court cited Hicks v. Miranda which
said that Miller II was binding since it was dismissed after the
Court had considered, on the merits, the federal constitutional
attack on section 311.22
The California Supreme Court concluded that section 311
meets the federal constitutional standards established by
Miller. In Bloom the court held that section 311 "has been and
is to be limited to patently offensive representations or descriptions of the specific 'hard core' sexual conduct given as examples in Miller I. . . .As so construed, the statute is not uncon23
stitutionally vague.
Bloom further held that section 311 does not violate the
due process clause of the California Constitution.24 The plaintiff in Bloom argued that even if section 311, as authoritatively
construed, met the specificity requirement of Miller, judging a
work's "prurient interest" or "social value" is so subjective and
unpredictable that a potential violator is denied fair notice of
what is prohibited by the statute and therefore is denied due
process of law. The Bloom majority summarily dismissed the
"fair notice" claim, citing Hamling,25 Miller,2" and Roth v.
United States27 for the proposition that obscenity legislation is
not vulnerable to attack under the federal due process clause.
The Bloom court stated that the California Constitution "does
not impose a stricter standard" in its due process clause on this
2
point. 1
20. Id. at 359. The three-judge federal court ruled that California courts
had not
construed section 311 "so as to give fair notice as to what is constitutionally
prohibited" and that section 311 et seq. was unconstitutional under Miller. Id.
21. 422 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1975).
22. Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d at 80-81, 545 P.2d at 235, 127
Cal. Rptr.
at 323.
23. Id. at 81, 545 P.2d at 235, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
24. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
25. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 89 (1974).
26. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27-28 (1973).
27. 354 U.S. 476, 491-92 (1957).
28. 16 Cal. 3d at 81, 545 P.2d at 235, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 323. The
California
Supreme Court in the past has relied on the California Constitution to apply
a stricter
standard than the federal standard established by the United States Supreme
Court.
Compare United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson
v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260 (1973) (approving body searches after custodial arrest for a traffic
offense)
with People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315 (1975) and
People v. Norman, 14 Cal.3d 929, 538 P.2d 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975)
(holding the
California Constitution guaranteed the right to be free of such searches).
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A third issue raised in Bloom was that the right to possess
obscene material in the privacy of one's own home, established
by the United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia,"
implied the right to receive and also to sell and distribute material for that purpose. The Bloom court noted that such a
broad interpretation of Stanley had been repudiated in California3° and\referred to the Supreme Court's answer to that claim
in United \States v. Reidel: "Whatever the scope of the right to
receive referred to in Stanley it is not so broad as to immunize
the dealings in obscenity in which Reidel engaged here
[distributing it by mail]-dealings that Roth held unprotected by the First Amendment."'"
The Bloom dissent argued that the first amendment guarantees free expression of all ideas and that attempts to suppress material as obscene amounts to censorship. Justice Tobriner rejected the majority approach as failing "to remedy
either the inherent vagueness of the obscenity concept, or the
unwarranted interference of such regulation with the individual's fundamental right to speak, to read and to view freely,
subject only to constitutional limitation."32 Justice Tobriner
urged the court to find that section 311, under the independent
force of the California Constitution, 33 was invalid in four respects:
First, that section 311 failed to provide fair notice as required under the due process clause of the California Constitution. 4 He argued that "no formulation of an obscenity standard
aimed at consenting adults can provide adequate notice to potential violators as to what conduct is permissible and what
will later be deemed criminal. 35
Second, that section 311 was "void for vagueness.'"" Jus29. 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
30. 16 Cal. 3d at 82, 545 P.2d at 236, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 324. The California
Supreme Court in People v. Luros, 4 Cal. 3d 84, 90-93, 480 P.2d 633, 637-39, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 833, 837-39 (1971), held that the right to possess in private did not extend to
commercial dealings in obscene material.
31. 402 U.S. 351, 355 (1971).
32. 16 Cal. 3d at 86, 545 P.2d at 239, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
33. Id. at 87, 545 P.2d at 240, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 328. The dissent pointed out that

the California Constitution was "a document of separate force and significance" and
in the past had been exercised independently from the United States Constitution. Id.
See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975);
Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 470 P.2d 345, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970).
34. 16 Cal. 3d at 88, 545 P.2d at 240, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 93, 545 P.2d at 244, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
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tice Tobriner contended that the statute was inconsistent with
the basic constitutional principle that "civilized society does
not imprison a person for violating prohibitions on conduct
that cannot even be defined." 37
Third, that section 311 was not supported by any compelling state interest in withholding assertedly obscene material
from consenting adults." The dissent did not find a valid governmental reason to intrude on the right of consenting adults
to receive information and ideas which the Supreme Court in
Stanley said must be present to justify subordinating constitutionally protected rights."
Fourth, that the California Constitution guarantees the
fundamental right of privacy that is "lodged in the 'penumbra'
of the Bill of Rights."' " The dissent contended that unless demonstrable harm can be shown, the state may not suppress any
form of expression that may appeal to an individual based on
a standard of "commonly held views of morality."'"
The dissent noted, however, that a wider scope of permissible regulation exists to "protect the unwilling adult from offen-

sive assaults on his sensibilities and

. . .

children from sexually

explicit material." 42
Bloom marks the first attempt by the California Supreme

37. Id. at 87, 545 P.2d at 239, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
38. Id. at 95, 545 P.2d at 245, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 333. The dissent rejected
the three
state interests generally offered as the bases of obscenity regulation:
"(1) prevention
of anti-social behavior assertedly caused by viewing such material;
(2) protection of
the individual's morality by restricting his access to it; and (3)
preservation of the
quality of life and community environment by eradicating public
sanction of obscenity." Id. at 96, 545 P.2d at 246, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
39. Id. at 95, 545 P.2d at 245, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 333. The United States
Supreme
Court had stated in Stanley v. Georgia: "Roth and its progeny certainly
do mean that.
the First and Fourteenth Amendments recognize a valid governmental
interest in
dealing with the problem of obscenity. But the assertion of that interest
cannot, in
every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections."
394 U.S. 557, 563
(1969).
40. 16 Cal. 3d at 95, 545 P.2d at 247, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 91, 545 P.2d at 242, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 330. California Penal
Code section
313.1 prohibits distribution or exhibition of "harmful matter" to
juveniles under 18
years of age. Harmful matter is defined in section 313(a) as:
matter which, taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of which to
the
average person, applying contemporary standards, is to prurient interest,
i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; and
is
matter which taken as a whole goes substantially beyond customary
limits of candor in description or representation of such matters; and
is
matter which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a) (West 1970).
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Court to enumerate the specific descriptions of sexual conduct
which will be proscribed as obscene under section 311. However, the court did not attempt to deal with the heart of the
obscenity problem and two unresolved issues remain to plague
courts in the future. First, the determination that particular
conduct is deemed obscene or offensive remains a highly
subjective decision under the definition of "patently offensive"
and must be made on a case-by-case basis. Second, no distinction is made between dissemination of material to consenting
adults and exposure of the same material to the unsoliciting
public.
For the past twenty years the courts have struggled to
establish guidelines and standards which would resolve the
subjective nature of judging obscenity cases. As defined by
Bloom, section 311 prohibits only broad general categories of
sexual activity43 and whether particular conduct is obscene
remains to be judged subjectively. Although the Miller examples propose an objective standard for defining obscenity, the
trier of fact will continue to submit material prosecuted under
the statute to a subjective test as to whether the work is "patently offensive"" according to prevailing community standards
that are constantly in a state of evolution.
Opponents of Miller disapprove any attempt to adopt a
standard to define the scope of obscenity except for limited
regulation to protect unconsenting adults and juveniles." Justice Douglas, dissenting in Miller, said:
The idea that the First Amendment permits government
to ban publications that are "offensive" to some people
puts an ominous gloss on freedom of the press. . . . The
idea that the First Amendment permits punishment for
ideas that are "offensive" to the particular judge or jury
43. Bloom indicates that some type of sexual activity must be involved in order
to constitute obscenity. 16 Cal. 3d at 79, 545 P.2d at 234, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 322. See
note 16 supra. The California court, in People v. Noroff, held that nudity alone is not
obscene. 67 Cal. 2d 791, 797, 433 P.2d 479, 483, 63 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 (1967). The
United States Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), also held that

"nudity alone is not enough to make material legally obscene under the Miller stan-

dards." Id. at 161.
44. Miller held that "no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure
of obscene materials unless those materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard
core' sexual conduct .... " 413 U.S. at 27. Thus, the state must define "patently
offensive." See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. at 160.
45. See, e.g., Justice Brennan's dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 112-13 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390, U.S. 629, 637 (1968); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968).
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sitting in judgment is astounding. . . . The use of the
standard "offensive" gives authority to government that
cuts the very vitals out of the First Amendment."
The problem of balancing the right to possess obscene material
in private and the right of the unconsenting public to its privacy, free from a flood of commercialized obscenity, remains to
be addressed.
The role of the legislature as the primary arbiter of obscenity is perhaps the most significant aspect of Bloom. The legislature's controlling hand is evidenced by the fact that section 311
retains the "utterly without redeeming social importance"
qualification which Miller removed from the constitutional
standard. 7 Bloom indicates that the practical effect of Miller
was to toss the problem back to the state legislature, which
could require, and the California legislature does require a
stricter standard than is constitutionally mandated.
The Bloom majority rejected the argument that the state
does not have a legitimate interest in regulating commercial
distribution of obscene material."8 Some of the public policy
factors which form a basis for the legislature's interest were
noted in ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton: "Rights and interests
'other than those of the advocates are involved.' These include
the interest of the public in the quality of life and the total
community environment, the tone of commerce in the great
city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself." 9 However,
the Bloom court was divided as to the legislature's course of
action. The majority merely upheld the state's interest in regulating commercial distribution of obscene material. Chief Justice Wright in his concurring opinion suggested adoption of a
standard directed at prohibiting distribution to juveniles and
46. 413 U.S. at 44-45 (dissenting opinion).
47. Section 311 is based upon the obscenity test established by Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), which provided:
[Tlhree elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or repre-

sentation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Id. at 418 (emphasis added). The effect of the Memoirs test was to impose a burden
on the prosecution to affirmatively prove that the material was "utterly without redeeming social value"-a burden which the Miller Court recognized as "virtually
impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof." 413 U.S. at 22.
48. 16 Cal. 3d at 82, 545 P.2d at 236, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
49. 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
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unconsenting adults,5" and the two dissenting justices urged the
acceptance of a "limited range of inhibiting legislation."', Although the judicial buck-passing in Bloom offers little in the
way of a solution, it illustrates that the courts have placed on
the state legislature the burden of resolving the standard of
obscenity subject to appellate review of constitutional claims
as indicated by Miller.2
The Commission on Obscenity and Pornography has reported that attempts to legislate for adults in the area of obscenity have been unsuccessful and that "vague and highly
subjective aesthetic, psychological and moral tests do not provide meaningful guidance for law enforcement officials, juries
or courts. As a result, law is inconsistently and sometimes erroneously applied and the distinctions made by courts between
prohibited and permissible materials often appear indefensible." 53 The United States Supreme Court, in United States v.
Reidel, pointed out the legislature's role:
It is urged that there is developing sentiment that adults
should have complete freedom to produce, deal in, possess,
and consume whatever communicative materials may
appeal to them and that the law's involvement with obscenity should be limited to those situations where children are involved or where it is necessary to prevent imposition on unwilling recipients of whatever age. . . . This
may prove to be the desirable and eventual legislative
course. But if it is, the task of restructuringthe obscenity
laws lies with those who pass, repeal, and amend statutes
and ordinances.4
Although Bloom has preserved the California obscenity
statute, the future of section 311 does not appear settled.
Melva M. Vollersen
50. 16 Cal. 3d at 85,545 P.2d at 238, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
51. Id. at 99, 545 P.2d at 248, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 336. The dissent called for a
"limited range of inhibiting legislation" directed at the "enforceable and reasonable
goal" of protecting the unconsenting public. Id.
52. Miller stated that appellate review offers protection to constitutional rights
from legislative infringement and noted that "the First Amendment values applicable
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately protected by the
ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional
claims when necessary." 413 U.S. at 25.
53. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, at 53 (1970).
54. 402 U.S. 351, 357 (1971) (emphasis added).

